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AMBIGUITY AVERSION AND THE
CRIMINAL PROCESS
Uzi Segal* and Alex Steint
Ambiguity aversion is a person's rational attitude towards the indetermi-
nacy of the probability that attaches to his future prospects, both favorable and
unfavorable. An ambiguity-averse person increases the probability of the unfa-
vorable prospect, which is what criminal defendants typically do when they face
a jury trial. The prosecution is not ambiguity averse. Being a repeat player
interested in the overall rate of convictions, it can depend upon any probability,
however indeterminate it may be. The criminal process therefore is systematically
affected by asymmetric ambiguity aversion, which the prosecution can exploit by
forcing defendants into harsh plea bargains. Professors Segal and Stein ex-
amine this issue theoretically, empirically, and doctrinally. They demonstrate
that asymmetric ambiguity aversion foils criminal justice and propose a law
reform that will fix this problem.
INTRODUCTION
This Article identifies and analyzes an intrinsic, but widely ne-
glected, feature of criminal trials: asymmetric ambiguity aversion. In a
paradigmatic jury trial, the probability of the defendant's conviction is
profoundly ambiguous. Only a highly generalized probability that re-
fers to a broad category of similar cases is available. The prosecution
can rely on this general probability, but the defendant cannot. For
the prosecution as a repeat player, this probability is reliable enough
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an indicator of the rate of convictions that it can attain over a long
series of cases.' For the defendant, this probability is not a reliable
indicator of his individual probability of being convicted. About this
individual probability the prosecution cares very little,2 but the defen-
dant cares a lot. The prosecution only cares about obtaining as high a
rate of convictions as possible in a long sequence of cases. 3 The de-
fendant, of course, only cares about his own case. Society should
mind this asymmetry if it is interested in having a fair and efficient
system of criminal justice. Prosecutors can exploit this asymmetry by
forcing defendants into plea bargains that are neither fair nor effi-
cient. In the American criminal justice system, plea bargain is a pre-
dominant method of case disposition. 4 The prosecution's ability to
1 See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REV. 95, 97-100 (1974) (stating that repeat players, such
as criminal prosecutors, can play the odds to maximize returns over a long series of
cases); see also L. JONATHAN COHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF INDUC-
TION AND PROBABILITY 47-53 (1989) (identifying the limits to which a repeat player
can rationally rely on a general frequency of events); P.A. Samuelson, Risk and Uncer-
tainty: A Fallacy of Large Numbers, 98 SCIENTIA 108 (1963) (demonstrating, inter alia,
that subdividing risks across cases is a more promising risk-management strategy than
a continual replication of identical independent risks).
2 The prosecution only cares about it in a few high-profile cases. See Judith L.
Maute, "In Pursuit ofJustice" in High Profile Criminal Matters, 70 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1745,
1747-50 (2002) (reporting that high-profile cases feature overzealous prosecution
and extravagant expenditures by the law enforcement agencies); William J. Stuntz,
The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REv. 505, 534-38, 542-46 (2001)
(describing prosecutors' different incentives in routine and salient prosecutions: in
routine cases-typically handled by local prosecutors-prosecutors economize their
efforts by obtaining as many convictions as possible through early plea bargaining in
order to satisfy the public at the lowest possible cost; in salient cases-typically han-
dled by federal prosecutors-prosecutors expend efforts in order to obtain experi-
ence and publicity).
3 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial 117 IARv.
L. REV. 2463, 2471 (2004) (observing that prosecutors uniformly care about their con-
viction statistics because "[f]avorable win-loss statistics boost prosecutors' egos, their
esteem, their praise by colleagues, and their prospects for promotion and career ad-
vancement"); Steven D. Dillingham, Performance Measurement: Beyond Conviction Rates,
PROSECUTOR, Nov.-Dec. 2002, at 9, 9, 14 (observing that conviction rates are consid-
ered to be prosecutors' "key performance indicators" and criticizing misuses of this
criterion); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Uncertain Bargains: The Rise of Plea Bargaining in
America, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1721, 1722-23 (2005) (reviewing GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BAR-
GAINING'S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003)) (analyzing
Fisher's claim that prosecutors tend to plea bargain to enhance their win rate).
4 See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAIN-
ING IN AMERICA 230 (2003) (observing that plea bargaining "became the dominant
force in criminal procedure" and that it "grew so entrenched in the halls of power
that today... it can grow no more"); MIKE MCCONVILLE & CHESTER L. MIRSKv, JURY
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exploit the defendant's ambiguity aversion is therefore particularly
pernicious. The legal system ought to eliminate this ability or at least
reduce it as much as it can.
An individual defendant cannot rely on the general rate of con-
victions that attaches to the relevant category of cases. This rate aver-
ages the low-rate and the high-rate clusters of cases falling within the
category. Statistically, these clusters cancel out. The defendant, how-
ever, needs to account for the possibility that his individual case falls
into the high-rate cluster. The defendant's case may belong to the
low-rate cluster as well, but this prospect is purely statistical. As such,
it does not automatically cancel out the defendant's scenario in which
he is most likely to be convicted. The individual-as opposed to gen-
eral-probability of this scenario is highly ambiguous.
A typical criminal defendant is ambiguity averse. 5 He fears the
ambiguity of his probability of conviction, over which he exercises no
control. This ambiguity makes the defendant pessimistic about his
chances of acquittal. In estimating his individual probability of con-
viction, the defendant adjusts the general probability of conviction
upwards to reflect that pessimism. 6 This upward adjustment generates
the asymmetry detrimental to the criminal justice system. The defen-
dant believes that his chances of being convicted by the jury are high,
relative to what the prosecutor believes them to be. Aware of the de-
fendant's ambiguity aversion, the prosecutor might exploit it in order
to boost his or her performance and career. The prosecutor will offer
the defendant a harsh plea bargain that the defendant will have to
accept. This plea bargain will impose on the defendant a criminal
sanction (conviction and penalty) that exceeds the average. The pros-
ecutor can exercise the same strategy against other defendants. The
result will be a conviction of some innocent defendants, as well as im-
position of excessive punishments upon others. This overcriminaliza-
tion is both unfair and inefficient.
The prevalence of plea bargains across the United States7 makes
this outcome grossly inefficient and unfair. Permitting the prosecu-
tion to achieve it also allows it to snowball. After raising the rate of
TRIALS AND PLEA BARGAINING 327-37 (2005) (describing and explaining the displace-
ment of trial by plea bargaining).
5 See infra notes 39, 62-70, 182-257 and accompanying text. This dislike of am-
biguous probabilities stands apart from a person's aversion towards risk. Risk aversion
is a general reluctance to gamble that persists even when the relevant probabilities are
known. See infra notes 97-100, 109-12 and accompanying text.
6 See infra Part II.
7 See, e.g., Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101
YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992) (observing that plea bargaining "is the criminal justice
system").
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convictions through plea bargaining, the prosecution will play the
same strategy against new defendants, whose pessimism about the out-
comes of their trials will intensify relative to their predecessors. These
defendants will accept an even harsher penalty than did their prede-
cessors. This dynamic will repeat itself again and again, to the detri-
ment of defendants and the criminal justice system as a whole.
This Article does not merely diagnose this fundamental problem,
but also tells how to remedy it. We proceed in the following order.
Part I explains the meaning and rationality of ambiguity aversion-a
person's upward adjustment of the indeterminate probability that at-
taches to his or her worst-case scenario. Subsequently, it identifies the
asymmetric-ambiguity-aversion phenomenon-a profound imbalance be-
tween the defendant's and the prosecution's aversion towards unpre-
dictability of jury trials. Asymmetric ambiguity aversion is a
widespread phenomenon in jury trials. Bench trials, in which every-
thing is decided by a single judge, are generally predictable. They do
involve a certain degree of ambiguity, but are far from being as ambig-
uous as jury trials. The asymmetric ambiguity aversion that bench tri-
als involve is therefore far from being as acute as in jury trials.8
Part II explains how the prosecution in a jury trial-a repeat
player with no aversion towards indeterminate probabilities-can take
advantage of the defendant's ambiguity aversion by forcing him into a
harsh plea bargain that is neither fair nor efficient. This argument
repudiates the traditional view which holds that jury trials benefit de-
fendants. 9 For defendants, bench trials generally work better than
jury trials because the defendant's probability of being convicted by a
judge is relatively unambiguous. This probability is unambiguous be-
cause judges, unlike juries, are reliably committed to the institution-
ally affirmed and generally known reasons in deciding about both
facts and law. A defendant facing an unambiguous probability of con-
viction does not adjust it upwards.10 He experiences no fear of ambi-
8 To maintain methodological clarity, we describe bench trials as unambiguous,
which means "unambiguous relative to jury trials." We also acknowledge that risk
aversion (as opposed to aversion towards ambiguity) may exist in both bench and jury
trials. See infra notes 97-100, 109-12 and accompanying text.
9 See, e.g., RANDOLF N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 18-24 (2003) (stat-
ing the conventional wisdom that perceivesjuries as protecting individuals from being
abused by the government); John B. Attanasio, Foreword: Juries Rule, 54 SMU L. REV.
1681, 1681-82 (2001) (restating the traditional view under which "[t]he jury is one of
the key protections of individual rights, shielding the individual against the govern-
ment. Before government can fine, imprison, or kill a member of the community,
that person has a right to a jury trial").
10 By this and similar statements we mean, once again, that the probability's up-
ward adjustment in a bench trial is negligible relative to jury trials.
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guity and therefore has no rational reason for making such an
adjustment. This defendant's plea bargain with the prosecution con-
sequently is likely to be both fair and efficient.
Defendants, therefore, should only opt for a jury trial when their
aversion towards ambiguity is outweighed by the expected gain. For
example, a defendant may be facing strong evidence that makes his
conviction by ajudge practically certain. Such defendants may ration-
ally decide to take their chances with a jury. For them, the probabilis-
tic ambiguity that jury trials involve is desirable. Another defendant
may have a reason to believe that the judge is biased in the prosecu-
tion's favor.' This defendant may also rationally prefer ajury trial to
a trial by ajudge. This latter scenario, however, is quite exceptional-
an observation originating from yet another new insight that this Arti-
cle develops. Trialjudges prefer bench trials over trials byjury. From
the trial judges' perspective, jury trials are both effort intensive and
time consuming. 12 Judges consequently try to avoid the jury-trial pros-
pect by creating reputations for being evenhanded. Bench trials en-
able judges to clear dockets and showcase their reputation-enhancing
qualities more efficiently than injury trials. 13 The defendant and the
prosecution usually need to consent to a switch from ajury trial-the
constitutional default for criminal litigationI4-to a trial before a
judge. 15 To make this switch an attractive possibility for both the de-
11 The defendant also may have reasons to believe thatjurors will be biased in his
or her favor. This scenario is unlikely because jurors, unlike judges, can be substi-
tuted by others (either for cause or following peremptory challenges). See infra notes
56-59 and accompanying text.
12 See BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE STATISTicS-2003, at 447 tbl.5.43 (Ann L. Pastore & Kathleen Maguire
eds., 2004) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS], available at
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/ (reporting, in relation to federal prosecutions,
that, on the average, a bench trial is about four times faster than a jury trial); see also
Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Double Jeopardy's Asymmetric Appeal Rights: What Purpose Do
They Serve?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 341, 398 n.219 (2002) (arguing that jury trials are gener-
ally costlier than bench trials).
13 Khanna, supra note 12, at 398 n.219.
14 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Im-
peachment, shall be byJury. . . ."); id. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . public trial, by an impartial jury . . ").
15 See FED. R. CRAM. P. 23(a), under which the defendant can waive his or her
right to ajury trial and switch to a bench trial. Effectuation of this waiver depends on
the prosecution's consent and the court's approval. See Singer v. United States, 380
U.S. 24, 26, 36-37 (1965) (upholding the constitutionality of FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a)
and reaffirming the rule that criminal defendants cannot unilaterally choose a bench,
as opposed to jury, trial). This rule is adopted in most jurisdictions across the United
States. See infra notes 26-27.
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fendant and the prosecution, thejudge needs to credibly exhibit even-
handedness, professionalism, and an unqualified commitment to the
institutionally affirmed reasons for decisions. By acting upon this in-
centive, judges make their decisions predictable. Jury trials therefore
play an important role in the criminal justice system. They improve
the quality of bench trials by presenting a costly alternative thatjudges
generally want to avoid. 16
Part III identifies two legal mechanisms that reduce the effects of
the asymmetric ambiguity aversion and thereby counterbalance the
prosecution's advantage in plea bargaining. Both mechanisms are es-
tablished by the Constitution's Fifth Amendment. One of these mech-
anisms is the rule against double jeopardy.' 7 This rule attenuates the
effects of the asymmetric ambiguity aversion by setting an asymmetric
system of criminal appeals. Under this system, acquittals are not ap-
pealable, but convictions are.18 This system indiscriminately skews le-
gal errors to the prosecution's side. By doing so, it reduces the
probability of conviction for both guilty and innocent defendants. 19
This probability reduction has nothing to do with the merits of the
defendant's case. This separates the rule against double jeopardy
from other procedural rules that account for the defendant's possible
guilt or innocence. These other rules, such as the proof-beyond-all-
reasonable-doubt requirement, also reduce the defendant's
probability of conviction. Yet, they do not do so indiscriminately.
For that reason, the criminal justice system can justifiably remove
the double jeopardy prohibition. Alternatively, the system may keep
the prohibition to offset nonmeritorious-and yet unavoidable-in-
creases in the defendant's probability of conviction. This is what the
rule against double jeopardy effectively does. This rule reduces the
upward adjustment that an ambiguity-averse defendant introduces
into the probability of his conviction. The outcome of this setoff, how-
ever, can only be gauged in intuitive terms. The probability of a pro-
defendant error generated by the rule against double jeopardy does
not appear to be large enough to eliminate the upward adjustment.
16 Justice White may have had it in mind when he observed that "[e]ven where
defendants are satisfied with bench trials, the right to a jury trial very likely serves its
intended purpose of making judicial ... unfairness less likely." Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968).
17 In the constitutional language, "nor shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
18 SeeWAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 25.1 (a)-(b), 25.3 (3d ed.
2000).
19 See Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error in Criminal Cases: Some Consequences of the
Asymmetry in the Right To Appeal, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 17-27 (1990).
2006] AMBIGUITY AVERSION AND THE CRIMINAL PROCESS
Another corrective mechanism is a grand jury review-a proceed-
ing that determines whether the accusations merit an indictment. 20
This proceeding generates information about the defendant's pros-
pect of being convicted in a jury trial. The defendant can obtain this
information from the results of the grand jurors' vote on the indict-
ment decision. For the defendant, this information functions as a
straw-vote on the case. This information disambiguates the defen-
dant's probability of conviction, but it does so incompletely. In most
jurisdictions, the grand jury only decides about a probable cause for
filing an indictment, 21 a far cry from what will happen at the defen-
dant's trial. 22 Moreover, the right to a grand jury review is limited.
This right is only available in federal prosecutions and in the states
that prosecute felonies by indictment rather than information. 23
Part III therefore ultimately offers to allow criminal defendants to
choose between a trial by jury and a bench trial.24 Under the United
States Constitution, a defendant is only entitled to a jury trial. 25 Nu-
20 U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for
a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury").
21 See United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1196-98 (9th Cir. 2005)
(observing that in federal and most state jurisdictions, grand jurors are instructed to
return an indictment upon finding a probable cause to believe that the accused is
guilty of the offense charged).
22 Minnesota has a different grand jury model. This model instructs grand jurors
that they are "not obliged to return an indictment, even though ... there is probable
cause, if [they] do not feel there is a reasonable prospect of a conviction." MINN. R.
CRiM. P. 18.07.
23 See LAFAvE ET AL., supra note 18, § 15.l (d)-(g) (listing and explaining the dif-
ferences between the indictment and information jurisdictions).
24 Cf Adam H. Kurland, Providing a Federal Criminal Defendant with a Unilateral
Right to a Bench Trial: A Renewed Call To Amend Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(a),
26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 309 (1993). Professor Kurland proposes to allow a defendant to
choose between ajury trial and a bench trial for reasons different from ours. Accord-
ing to him, some defendants may want to escape from biased and incompetent ju-
rors-an observation pertaining in particular to complex and high-profile cases.
Professor Kurland also believes that a defendant's right to select the trial-mode will
affect only a few cases and "will work no drastic shift in federal criminal law" except
for "complex and high profile cases, where the defendant's decision to elect a bench
trial is the most compelling." Id. at 364. We estimate the effect of the proposed right
as most substantial. Under our theory, the right to opt for a bench trial will prevent
many thousands of defendants from being forced into harsh and inefficient plea bar-
gains. As mentioned at the outset, plea bargain is the prevalent method of case dispo-
sition in both state and federal courts. Focusing solely upon trials is therefore
methodologically wrong.
25 See supra notes 14-15.
1501
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
merous states have adopted a similar arrangement.26 When a defen-
dant wants to be tried by a judge, his wish can only be granted upon
the prosecution's consent and the court's approval. 27 New York, 28 Illi-
26 See Kurland, supra note 24, at 322 nn.40 & 42, 323 n.43 (listing numerous
jurisdictions that follow the federal model, with and without variations); see also Peo-
ple v. Dist. Court, 953 P.2d 184, 186 (Colo. 1998) ("[T]he People may refuse to con-
sent to the defendant's request to waive a jury trial, so long as that refusal comports
with a defendant's due process rights as provided in the United States and Colorado
Constitutions"); State v. Dunne, 590 A.2d 1144, 1146-51 (N.J. 1991) (holding that
defendants in NewJersey courts have no constitutional right to a bench trial, but the
trial court has a discretion to grant the defendant's bench-trial request in accordance
with the following guidelines: "At one end of the scale, tilting in favor ofjury trial, will
be the gravity of the crime. The higher the degree of the crime, the greater the
weight given to that factor. Other factors that will tip the scale will be the position of
the State, the anticipated duration and complexity of the State's presentation of the
evidence, the amenability of the issues to jury resolution, the existence of a highly-
charged emotional atmosphere . . . , the presence of particularly-technical matters
that are interwoven with fact, and the anticipated need for numerous rulings on the
admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence."); State v. Oakley, 72 P.3d 1114, 1118-20
(Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that Washington statutes granting the State the right
to demand ajury trial over a defendant's objection does not violate the Washington
Constitution because defendants have no constitutional right to a nonjury trial).
27 See supra note 26. In State v. Burks, 674 N.W.2d 640 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003), the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's decision to turn down the defen-
dant's request for a bench trial, consented to by the State. The trial court reasoned
that "'assessment of a person's intent is something which is quintessentially suited for
ajury of 12 citizens. The virtue that the jury brings to our courtroom is that they carry
with them the communal assessment of the ethics and standards from our commu-
nity.'" Id. at 643. The court of appeals held that "[a] Ithough the right of a defendant
in a criminal case to be tried by an impartial jury is well-entrenched in both the fed-
eral and state constitutions, a defendant does not have a reciprocal constitutional
right to waive a jury and be tried by a judge." Id. at 644. For that reason, it decided
that
like the prosecution's decision to withhold consent to a defendant's request
to waive his or her right to a jury trial, the trial court also need not explain
its decision to withhold its approval, and absent extraordinary circumstances
not present here, its decision to withhold approval, like the prosecution's
decision to withhold consent, is not reviewable.
Id. at 645.
28 N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 2 (providing that "[a] jury trial may be waived by the de-
fendant in all criminal cases, except those in which the crime charged may be punish-
able by death, by a written instrument signed by the defendant in person in open
court before and with the approval of ajudge or justice of a court having jurisdiction
to try the offense"); N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 320.10(2) (McKinney 2002) (requiring
the court to approve the defendant's waiver of ajury trial and conduct a bench trial
instead "unless it determines that it is tendered as a stratagem to procure an otherwise
impermissible procedural advantage or that the defendant is not fully aware of the
consequences of the choice he is making"). Courts interpret these provisions as gen-
erally permitting defendants in noncapital cases to opt for a bench trial unilaterally.
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nois,29 Iowa,3 0 and a number of other states3 1 allow defendants to opt
See People v. Davis, 400 N.E.2d 313, 316 (N.Y. 1979) ("It can no longer be disputed
that defendant had a constitutional right to waive trial by jury . .. ."); People ex rel.
Rohrlich v. Follette, 229 N.E.2d 419, 421 (N.Y. 1967) (holding that the judge's discre-
tion to deny a defendant's request for a bench trial can only be exercised upon
grounds qualifying as compelling which do not include the judge's desire to entrust
fact-finding to ajury); People v. Duchin, 190 N.E.2d 17, 17-18 (N.Y. 1963) (holding
that N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2 "is designed for the benefit of the defendant. When,
choosing to be tried by a judge alone, he requests a waiver, he is entitled to it as a
matter of right once it appears to the satisfaction of the judge that ... the waiver is
tendered in good faith and is not a stratagem to procure an otherwise impermissible
procedural advantage").
29 See People v. Gersch, 553 N.E.2d 281, 283 (Ill. 1990) (reaffirming the Joyce
principle, under which a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to a bench
trial, and holding that it was a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights to give
the State the right to demand jury trial over the defendant's waiver); People ex reL
Daley v. Joyce, 533 N.E.2d 873, 879 (Ill. 1988) (holding that a criminal defendant has
a constitutional right to choose between a jury and a bench trial and invalidating a
statute that conditioned the substitution of ajury trial by a bench trial upon the prose-
cution's consent); People v. Reed, 319 N.E.2d 557, 558-59 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (hold-
ing that the rule laid down in Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965), does not apply
in Illinois and that the trial judge erred in not accepting the defendant's waiver of
jury trial over the State's objection to that waiver).
30 See State v. Henderson, 287 N.W.2d 583, 586 (Iowa 1980) (interpreting IOWA R.
CRIM. P. 16(1) as conferring upon criminal defendants an absolute fight to waive jury
and be tried by a judge).
31 Namely Connecticut, Louisiana, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, New Hamp-
shire, and Ohio. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-82b (West 2001) (allowing defend-
ants to unilaterally switch from a jury to a bench trial); CONN. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P.
39-19(5) (providing that the judicial authority shall not accept a defendant's plea of
guilty or nolo contendere without first determining that the defendant fully under-
stands "[t]he fact that he or she... has the right to be tried by ajury or ajudge"); LA.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 780(A) (1998) ("A defendant charged with an offense
other than one punishable by death may knowingly and intelligently waive a trial by
jury and elect to be tried by the judge."); MD. R. CRIM. CAUSES 4-246 (allowing defend-
ants "knowingly and voluntarily" to opt for a bench trial instead of a jury trial);
Thomas v. State, 598 A.2d 789, 790 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (stating that criminal
defendants in Maryland have "a long standing common law right to choose between a
trial by jury and a trial by the court"); State ex rel. Nelson v. Mont. Ninth Judicial Dist.
Court, 863 P.2d 1027, 1034 (Mont. 1993) (holding that a criminal defendant can opt
for a bench trial unilaterally under Montana law); State v. Carpenter, 150 N.W.2d 129,
131 (Neb. 1967) (interpreting the right to ajury trial under Nebraska Constitution as
"personal to the defendant" with the consequence that "the state is without power to
require [a jury trial] if the defendant wishes to waive it"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 606:7 (LexisNexis 2003) (allowing defendants to choose a bench trial unilaterally
before jury is impaneled, but conditioning the switch to a bench trial in a multi-defen-
dant case upon each defendant's consent); OHIO R. CRIM. P. 23(A) ("In serious of-
fense cases the defendant before commencement of the trial may knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily waive in writing his right to trial by jury. Such waiver may
1503
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for a bench trial unilaterally. 32 Our theory offers a similar approach.
Under our theory, defendants should be able to opt for a bench trial
without the prosecution's consent and the court's approval. 33
Part IV tests our theory against empirical data. These data in-
clude the rates of bench and jury trials, both state and federal, as well
as the acquittal rates that bench and jury trials respectively produce.
Our analysis of these data identifies two fundamental trends. Bench
trials are prevalent in jurisdictions with high trial rates. When many cases
go to trial, the vast majority of the trials are bench trials, rather than
trials by jury. Furthermore, the rate of acquittal in bench trials is much
higher than in trials by jury. We link these trends to the defendants'
ambiguity aversion. In jurisdictions with low trial rates-where the
prosecution prosecutes only strong cases and obtains many guilty
pleas, unilateral and plea bargained-most defendants face solid in-
criminating evidence upon which they expect to be convicted by a
professional judge. Such defendants have no ambiguity to be anxious
about. To the contrary, they have every reason to seek ambiguity. An
indeterminate jury trial offers such defendants a slight prospect of ac-
quittal (usually erroneous), which they purchase by paying their attor-
neys' fees and by exposing themselves to a possible sentencing
retaliation by the judge (a defendant who wasted the judge's time
must expect the judge to waste his).34 For that reason, the acquittal
also be made during trial with the approval of the court and the consent of the prose-
cuting attorney."); State v. Jells, 559 N.E.2d 464, 468 (Ohio 1990) (holding that
"[t]here is no requirement in Ohio for the trial court to interrogate a defendant in
order to determine whether he or she is fully apprised of the right to a jury trial" and
that "[t]he Criminal Rules ... are satisfied by a written waiver, signed by the defen-
dant, filed with the court, and made in open court, after arraignment and opportu-
nity to consult with counsel").
32 Under the Oregon Constitution, defendants in noncapital cases can opt for a
bench trial, but this right is conditioned on the judge's approval. The prosecution
cannot veto the defendant's written request for a bench trial. See State v. Baker, 976
P.2d 1132, 1137 (Or. 1999). Minnesota has a similar rule. See Gaulke v. State, 184
N.W.2d 599, 602 (Minn. 1971) (advising in dictum that a defendant's request for a
bench trial requires approval of the trial court, but not the prosecution's consent).
33 The rule against double jeopardy and the grand jury mechanism do not merely
ameliorate the problem focused upon by this Article. They have other functions as
well. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 18, §§ 15.1(a), 25.1(b) (rationalizing the rule
against double jeopardy and the grand jury review of criminal charges as tackling the
threat of governmental oppression). We therefore do not extend our recommenda-
tions to these two pillars of the criminal justice system.
34 See, e.g., Richard Klein, Due Process Denied: Judicial Coercion in the Plea Bargaining
Process, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1349, 1349-50 (2004) (reporting that judges commonly
"up the sentence" when the defendant chooses to go to trial and is ultimately found
guilty).
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rate injury trials is relatively low (15% on the average).3 5 Defendants
with solid acquittal prospects unequivocally prefer bench trials. We
discern this phenomenon from the high rate of acquittals in bench
trials (46% on the average).36 We also deduce it from the prevalence
of bench trials in jurisdictions with high trial rates. 37 In these jurisdic-
tions, the prosecution's nonmeticulous indictment policy produces
many cases with thinly evidenced accusations.38 Many defendants
consequently go to trial. Because such defendants have solid acquittal
prospects (and are often factually innocent), they prefer a bench trial
to a trial by jury. They are unwilling to entrust their solid acquittal
prospects in jurors' hands. Ambiguity aversion is the most plausible
explanation for this preference.
Our empirical investigation also identifies the demand for jury
consulting services and the virtual lack of demand for judge consult-
ing services. Many defendants are willing to pay for jury consultancy
in order to disambiguate their trial prospects and improve their plea
bargaining positions vis-A-vis the prosecution. Hence, asymmetric am-
biguity aversion is a problem not only in our theoretical model, but
also in reality.
This Article concludes by setting forth its normative proposal.
I. ASYMMETRIC AMBIGUITY AvERSION
Any prospect has its economic value for a person involved. This
value may be positive (a gain) or negative (a loss). It is determined by
three factors. The first factor is the anticipated outcome: the gain that
the person acquires or, alternatively, the loss that she suffers from the
prospect's materialization. The second factor is the prospect's
probability. The third factor is the adequacy of the information upon
which this probability is determined. The person's expected gain (or
loss) equals the full amount of the gain (or the loss) multiplied by the
prospect's probability. To complete the calculation of the prospect's
value, the person needs to account for the adequacy of the informa-
tion from which she derives the prospect's probability. When this in-
formation is wanting, the prospect's probability becomes
indeterminate or ambiguous. This informational deficiency has a
negative value for the person. The person consequently detracts this
35 See infra Table 1.
36 See infra Table 1.
37 See infra notes 186-218 and accompanying text.
38 See infra notes 186-218 and accompanying text.
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value from her expected gain or adds it to her expected loss. 39 Any
such adjustment reflects the person's aversion towards ambiguity.40
This Part explains this phenomenon and identifies its effect on the
criminal process. To this end, it utilizes three stylized examples. One
of these examples is further developed in Part II.
David faces serious criminal charges. The prosecution's case is
fairly strong, but there is also evidence that may exonerate David. The
prosecution offers David to take the case to a bench trial in which
everything will be decided by a single judge.4' David turns this offer
down and opts for a jury trial. By making this choice, David exercises
his fundamental constitutional right to a trial by his fellow citizens.
This right protects people from being oppressed by the government.42
Police, prosecution, and other agencies executing criminal law may
unjustly deprive a person of her freedoms. Arguably, only impartial
jurors can adequately protect an individual from such abuses. 43
Judges are ill qualified for that task because their appointments, pro-
motion, tenure, and salaries depend on the government. 44 Trial by
jury, therefore, is "the lamp that shows that freedom lives."' 45 This
bedrock of the American criminal justice system 46 allows citizens to
enforce their community values47 and to exercise their self-govern-
ment and political responsibility. 48
39 See Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q.J. ECON. 643,
657-69 (1961).
40 Id.
41 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a) (allowing the defendant to waive his or her right to a
jury trial).
42 See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 31 (1965) (explaining that the right to
a jury trial "was clearly intended to protect the accused from oppression by the
Government").
43 SeeJoN~AKr, supra note 9, at 18-40.
44 See, e.g., NANCY S. MARDER, THEJJRY PROCESS 35-36 (2005) (describing the jury
as a buffer that stands between the accused and all state agents, including prosecutors
and judges); Patrick E. Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty, 41 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1047, 1047-48 (1991) (arguing that the jury's function as a buffer between the
accused and the state is eroded by the sentencing rules that allow judges to make
factual findings).
45 PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BYJURY 164 (1956).
46 See Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 665 (2001) (describing "the right to have the
jury make the determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt" as "a bedrock ele-
ment of procedural fairness").
47 SeeJoNAKAFF, supra note 9, at 64-74 (describing jurors as enforcers of commu-
nity values); Adrian A.S. Zuckerman, Law, Fact orJustice?, 66 B.U. L. REV. 487, 494-508
(1986) (rationalizing the jury system as adjudication on the merits through invocation
of public values and sense of security).
48 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 258-64 (Harvey C. Mansfield
& Delba Winthrop eds., Univ. Chi. Press 2000) (1835).
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David's decision to be tried by a jury rather than a judge there-
fore appears perfectly rational. In fact, it is rational, but not perfectly
so. This decision would be perfectly rational if the judge adjudicating
David's case were biased in favor of the prosecution or if David had
some special reason to believe that jurors are going to be biased in his
favor. Absent such biases, a defendant's conviction prospect in a trial
by jury can only be assumed to be equal to his conviction prospect in a
bench trial. The rationality of David's choice consequently can be
questioned. This choice is likely to prove self-damaging in David's
plea bargaining with the prosecution.
This robust claim runs against the traditional wisdom. According
to this wisdom, the right to a jury trial benefits ordinary people such
as David. The traditional wisdom, however, completely ignores the
asymmetric ambiguity aversion-a fundamental feature of criminal jury
trials that this Article brings to the fore. Outcomes of criminal trials
before ajury are only predictable in terms that are inherently ambigu-
ous. 49 Criminal defendants are generally averse towards this ambigu-
ity, 50 as they should rationally be. 51 Their prosecutors, in contrast,
have no such aversion and no rational reasons for developing it. In
the pages ahead, we explain how prosecutors-as repeat players-can
exploit this systematic asymmetry by forcing unfavorable plea bargains
upon defendants. We also demonstrate that such bargains are neither
fair nor efficient. 52 David, a paradigmatic criminal defendant in our
example, is going to make one such bargain. Meanwhile, he turns to
estimating his probability of being convicted or, alternatively, acquit-
ted by the jury.
In making this estimation, David can only find out howjuries typi-
cally decide cases similar to his. Similarity between cases only helps
David to identify the prevalent decision pattern for the relevant cate-
49 SeeJEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 172, 173 (1930) (famously ob-
serving that "[a] better instrument than the usual jury trial could scarcely be imagined
for achieving uncertainty, capriciousness, lack of uniformity, disregard of former deci-
sions-utter unpredictability" and that "only a very foolish lawyer will dare guess the
outcome of a jury trial"); see also JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY- THE JURY SYSTEM
AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 145 (1994) ("[E]ven generalizations about groups are
of limited use in the jury context, because the behavior of jurors, as well as the local
community from which they are drawn, is so specific to the particular case on trial.");
Heather IR Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARv. L. REv. 1099, 1165 (2005) (ob-
serving that jury verdicts are indeterminate and can only be predicted within a gen-
eral "evidentiary range").
50 See infra pp. 1537-38.
51 See supra note 39 and accompanying text; infra notes 62-70 and accompanying
text.
52 See infra Part I.
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gory of cases. The scenario in which jurors deciding David's individ-
ual case follow this pattern is a different matter. This scenario is
probable, but there is no way for David to know how probable it is.
The probability of this scenario is unknowable or ambiguous, in our
terminology. David, therefore, must consider this ambiguity and its
implications for his trial management.
This situation is analogous to a lottery box from which each par-
ticipant draws one ball without seeing it. Drawing a white ball wins
the lottery. Drawing a red ball loses it. The balls are randomly thrown
into the box by an automatic feeder. There are no balls other than
red and white. An individual participant does not know, however,
how many red and white balls are in the box. David's jurors are simi-
lar to these balls in one crucial respect: they will be drawn from a large
pool of citizens almost as randomly as the balls in the box.53 The "fair
cross section" requirement that the pool from which jurors are se-
lected needs to satisfy54 diversifies the jury. The automatic feeder per-
forms a similar function in the lottery by picking balls-red and white
alike-from the entire pool. The jurors' randomized selection and
diversity forestall accurate predictions about their verdict.55 David's
jurors also must not have any pre-commitment to reasons affecting
their future verdict. Any such pre-commitment disqualifies the juror
for cause.56 David's and the prosecution's peremptory challenges may
disqualify a few other jurors as well. 57 Such challenges originate from
53 See DEVLIN, supra note 45, at 26 (describing the random selection of prospec-
tive jurors from the pool of citizens eligible for jury service); MARDER, supra note 44,
at 50-67 (describing the existing venire summoning methods that randomize the se-
lection of jurors).
54 See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) ("[T] he fair-cross-section
requirement [is] fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amend-
ment ... .");JoNAKAIrr, supra note 9, at 114-27 (describing the jury as the most diverse
of democratic bodies).
55 See Gerken, supra note 49, at 1165 ("Jury verdicts [especially in the criminal
context] represent an extreme example of the discrete, individual costs that can arise
from variation .... Some of these costs are reduced by the process ofjudicial review;
because the case made by a prosecutor needs to be within a certain evidentiary range
to survive appellate scrutiny, juries simply choose who among those 'within the range'
are punished"). For purposes of our theory, we only need to establish that jury ver-
dicts are considerably less predictable than decisions made by judges.
56 SeeJoNAKAIT, supra note 9, at 128-35.
57 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 18, § 22.3(d). The prosecution, however, is not
allowed to strike prospective jurors on racial grounds. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (holding that racial discrimination in jury selection offends the
Equal Protection Clause); see also Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2331-40 (2005)
(finding the state's jury selection techniques discriminatory); Johnson v. California,
15o8 [VOL. 81:4
2006] AMBIGUITY AVERSION AND THE CRIMINAL PROCESS
the parties' conjectures about jurors' individual biases. 58 The effects
of these mutual challenges on the jury selection cancel each other
out.59 Taken together, these factors make the jury's verdict unpredict-
able. Jurors remaining on the panel can decide the case either way.
David would only be able to predict the verdict if the evidence in
his case were one-sided. But it is not. As stated at the outset, the pros-
ecution's case against David is fairly strong, but is not overwhelming.
David has evidence that may exonerate him. One-sided evidence is an
unlikely scenario in cases that go to trial. Cases featuring one-sided
evidence do not normally go to trial. They are settled before trial.
When the evidence indisputably supports the defendant's case, the
prosecution normally discontinues.60 When the evidence indisputably
supports the accusations, the defendant normally enters a guilty
plea. 61 David's case goes to trial because its evidence is not unequivo-
cal. This evidence may work in both directions. The way in which
David's jurors will consider it is unknowable.
David now discovers that in about 50% of the cases similar to his
the jury found the defendant guilty. From this information he de-
duces a 50% probability of being convicted or acquitted. This general
probability, however, does not attach to David's individual case, in
which a new group of jurors will interact with a unique set of evi-
dence. The projected outcome of this individual interaction-a fac-
tor that determines the individual probability of David's conviction-
is unknowable. The similar-case category, into which David's case
falls, is general. This category accommodates several subcategories
separated by refined distinctions between the cases.
Assume that these subcategories include Group A and Group B.
Cases forming Group A exhibit a 70% rate of convictions and a 30%
rate of acquittals. In Group B, the rate of acquittals is 70% and the
125 S. Ct. 2410, 2416-19 (2005) (clarifying the criteria for ascertaining prosecutors'
racial motivations hiding behind peremptory strikes).
58 See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 218-20 (1965) (stating that peremptory
challenges are extensively used due to the parties' conjectures about jurors'
partiality).
59 Id. at 219 (stating that one of the functions of peremptory challenges is "to
eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides").
60 When evidence supporting the accusations is plainly insufficient, the prosecu-
tion usually drops the case. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 18, § 13.1 (b) ("As a practical
matter, the prosecutor is likely to require admissible evidence showing a high
probability of guilt, that is, sufficient evidence to justify confidence in obtaining a
conviction."). Alternatively, the judge delivers a directed acquittal. Id. § 24.6(b).
61 See Bibas, supra note 3, at 2497 n.134 (explaining the high rate of guilty pleas
by the fact that defense attorneys convince their clients to plead guilty-with and
without plea bargaining-in the face of overwhelming evidence).
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rate of convictions is, correspondingly, 30%. Other subcategories fea-
turing different projections for David's acquittal and conviction will
not change our example: they will cancel out. No identifiable factors
bring David's case closer to Group A than to Group B, or vice versa.
The probability of this case to fall into Group A, in which David's
probability of conviction equals 70%, is unknown. The probability of
this case to fall into Group B, in which David's probability of convic-
tion equals 30%, is unknown as well.
These unknown probabilities create a problem62 that can be con-
ceptualized by using "second-order probabilities." 63 This conceptual-
62 See Ellsberg, supra note 39. In this classic article, Ellsberg challenged the basic
idea that probabilities always exist by offering the following betting experiment. Id. at
650-53. Urn I contains 100 balls, red and black, of unknown composition. Urn II
contains fifty red and fifty black balls. Betting on Red-I means that one ball will be
drawn at random from Urn I and that you will win $100, if the ball is red, and $0 if
not. Other available bets, Black-I, Red-II, and Black-II are defined in the same way.
Which of the following bets would you prefer: (1) Red-I or Black-I; (2) Red-Il or
Black-Il; (3) Red-I or Red-Il; or (4) Black-I or Black-II? Ellsberg predicted that most
people would be indifferent between Red-I and Black-I, as well as between Red-Il and
Black-II. Yet, people generally prefer Red-II to Red-I and Black-II to Black-I. Betting
on balls contained in Urn II is a rational preference because such bets are more
informative than their Urn-I alternatives. These predictions have been verified in
many experiments conducted by empirical economists and cognitive psychologists.
See Colin Camerer & Martin Weber, Recent Developments in Modeling Preferences: Uncer-
tainty and Ambiguity, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 325 (1992) (surveying experiments that
verify the existence of ambiguity aversion and a number of theories addressing this
phenomenon); Craig R. Fox & Amos Tversky, Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Igno-
rance, 110 Q.J. ECON. 585, 588-99 (1995) (providing empirical affirmation to the am-
biguity-aversion phenomenon in settings featuring both determinable and
indeterminable probabilities); Gideon Keren & L6onie E.M. Gerritsen, On the Robust-
ness and Possible Accounts of Ambiguity Aversion, 103 AcTA PSYCHOLOGICA 149, 153-57
(1999) (demonstrating that ambiguity aversion holds for both gains and losses); Paul
Slovic & Amos Tversky, Who Accepts Savage's Axiom?, 19 BEHAV. Sci. 368 (1974) (dem-
onstrating that ambiguity aversion is systematic and does not originate from individu-
als' misunderstandings of the subject); W. Kip Viscusi & Harrell Chesson, Hopes and
Fears: The Conflicting Effects of Risk Ambiguity, 47 THEORY & DECISION 153, 167-68
(1999) (demonstrating that individuals are ambiguity averse when facing relatively
small probabilities of loss and ambiguity seeking when the probability of loss is high;
the average crossover probability is demonstrated to be about 0.5).
63 See Jamil Baz et al., Risk Perception in the Short Run and in the Long Run, 10
MARKETING LETrERS 267, 268-69 (1999); Camerer & Weber, supra note 62; Ellsberg,
supra note 39, at 656-60 (observing that ambiguity aversion is a behavioral phenome-
non that involves "the operation of definite normative criteria" and introducing dif-
ferent criteria to account for probabilistic ambiguity); Barbara E. Kahn & Rakesh K_
Sain, Modeling Ambiguity in Decisions Under Uncertainty, 15 J. CONSUMER RES. 265,
267-68 (1988) (explaining the concept of second-order probability and linking it to
ambiguity aversion).
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ization differentiates between a first-order probability that describes
the likelihood of the event to which it attaches and a second-order
probability that determines the reliability of the first-order probability.
Second-order probabilities attach to first-order probabilities that, in
turn, attach to the relevant events. Formally, when a defendant's gen-
eral probability of being acquitted by the jury is denoted as a, and
when the defendant does not feel sure and is consequently pessimistic
about this first-order probability-the defendant multiplies it by an-
other (second-order) probability (p) that identifies the intensity of his
belief in a.64  The defendant consequently estimates that his
probability of conviction does not equal 1 - a, as would have been the
case had he not been ambiguity averse. In the defendant's eyes, this
probability equals 1 - pa. Both p and a are greater than 0 and less
than 1 (0 represents the impossibility and 1 the absolute certainty of
the underlying factual scenario). Hence, 1 - pa > 1 - a. This is the
crudest, but nonetheless adequate, way of formalizing ambiguity aver-
sion. 65 Another simple way of doing it is to introduce the appropriate
addition to the defendant's probability of conviction. 66 This addition
64 See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 227 (1921) ("A man may
act upon an estimate of the chance that his estimate of the chance of an event is a
correct estimate.").
65 For more sophisticated models see Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, Maxmin
Expected Utility with Non-Unique Prior, 18J. MATHEMATICAL ECON. 141 (1989) (perceiv-
ing a nonprobabilistic event as a situation in which the decisionmaker identifies sev-
eral possible probabilities as applicable to the event and then behaves in accordance
with the worst-case scenario: in choosing between the probabilities, the deci-
sionmaker ascribes the lowest possible probability to a favorable outcome and the
highest possible probability to an unfavorable outcome); Edi Karni & David Schmei-
dler, Utility Theory with Uncertainty, in 4 HANDBOOK OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 1763
(Werner Hildenbrand & Hugo Sonnenschein eds., 1991) (surveying formal models
that analyze ambiguity aversion in nonprobabilistic events); David Schmeidler, Subjec-
tive Probability and Expected Utility Without Additivity, 57 ECONOMETRiCA 571 (1989)
(modeling nonprobabilistic events by nonadditive probabilities, also known as Cho-
quet expected-utility); Uzi Segal, The Ellsberg Paradox and Risk Aversion: An Anticipated
Utility Approach, 28 INT'L ECON. REV. 175, 177-83 (1987) (modeling uncertainty as a
probability distribution over possible values of the true probability).
66 Formally, the value of the gamble "x if event A happens and y if event B hap-
pens," where B is not-A, is given by u(x)n(A) + u(y) [1 - nr(A)], when x < y; and by
u(y)Tr(B) + u(x)[I - n(B)], when y < x (u and r denote "utility" and "probability,"
respectively). When nT(A) + n(B) = 1-that is, when the relevant probabilities of mu-
tually exclusive events are additive-the ordinary expected utility analysis holds
ground. Ambiguity aversion is observable when nT(A) + n(B) > 1-that is, when the
probabilities become nonadditive. Assume that in Ellsberg's Two-Urn example n(Red-
1) and r(Black-I) both equal 0.6, while n(Red-II) and n(Black-II) both equal 0.5. Also
assume, for the sake of convenience, that u(0) = 0 and u(100) = 100. The value of
each of the Urn-I gambles, Red-I and Black-I, consequently equals [1 - 0.6] . 100 = 40,
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should represent the defendant's pessimism about his general
probability of acquittal. This pessimism is not irrational. 67 Rather, it
is rationally instilled by the indeterminacy of the relevant probabili-
ties. 68 This informational deficiency reduces the economic value of
the defendant's situation. 69 This situation is inferior to a setting fea-
turing equal, but unambiguous, probabilities of conviction and
acquittal. 70
David's conviction is an event that has a 0.7 first-order probability
in Group A and a 0.3 first-order probability in Group B. Each of these
probabilities crucially depends on the second-order probability that
David attaches to the scenario in which his case falls into Group A as
opposed to Group B, or vice versa. Because these second-order
probabilities are objectively indeterminable, it is possible to assume
them to be equal.71 This assumption holds that David's case is as
likely to fall into Group A as into Group B. 72 This is why it affiliates to
a broader category of cases that accommodates these groups as subcat-
egories. This broad category projects a 50% chance for both convic-
while the value of each of the Urn-II gambles, Red-II and Black-Il, is [1 - 0.5] x 100 =
50.
67 See Ellsberg, supra note 39, at 663. The different attitudes toward this probabil-
istic indeterminacy (or ambiguity) have nothing to do with risk aversion that repre-
sents aversion to fluctuation in the outcomes. In our model, jury and bench trials
carry the same set of possible outcomes: an acquittal or, alternatively, a conviction,
which we assume for simplicity to carry the same penalty, regardless of the chosen
trial mode. Our model also assumes that judges and juries do not differ in their
conviction rates in adjudicating similar cases. A simple expected-payoff model that eval-
uates uncertain prospects only by their outcomes and probabilities (regardless of the
probabilities' epistemic credentials) is therefore unable to differentiate between jury
and bench trials. To properly differentiate between the two trial environments, one
needs to distinguish between the probabilities' epistemic credentials. Specifically,
one needs to acknowledge that some probabilities are ambiguous and some are not
and that people rationally fear probabilistic ambiguity. See supra note 39 and accom-
panying text; infra notes 97-100, 108-12 and accompanying text.
68 Legal advice cannot substantially reduce this indeterminacy. We assume
throughout this Article that defendants are represented by skillful attorneys. These
attorneys, however, can only predict jurors' verdicts in probabilistic terms that are
highly ambiguous.
69 Ellsberg, supra note 39, at 657.
70 As powerfully explained by Ellsberg, "But having exploited knowledge, guess,
rumor, assumption, advice, to arrive at a final judgment that one event is more likely
than another or that they are equally likely, one can still stand back from this process
and ask: 'How much, in the end, is all this worth?"' Id. at 659-60.
71 This assumption derives from the statistical "principle of indifference." See Co-
HEN, supra note 1, at 43-47.
72 Under this assumption, David's 50% probability of being convicted is calcu-
lated as follows: (50% • 70%) + (50% • 30%).
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tions and acquittals, but David can hardly rely on this generalized
projection. He knows that his case either falls into Group A or into
Group B. The 50% probability that attaches to each of these scenarios
is premised on the absence of reasons that reliably distinguish be-
tween Group A and Group B. There are no reasons differentiating
between the two groups of similarly looking cases that David can de-
pend upon. Most importantly, David's jurors are not pre-committed
to any such reason. They are only committed in general terms to try
David's case fairly and impartially.73 Jurors also give no reasons to
justify their verdicts.74
Unreasoned verdicts are the key factor separating trials by jury
from bench trials. 75 This factor makes David's 50% probability of con-
viction indeterminable or ambiguous. 76 David has good reasons to
fear this ambiguity. This fear impels David to consider the possibility
that the unknown second-order probabilities are not equal. That is,
the chance that his case actually belongs to Group A, rather than
Group B, may well be above 50%. This pessimistic estimation turns
David's prospect of being convicted by the jury into more probable
than not.
The prosecution has no similar fears. Because there is no reason
to believe that the unknown information about individual cases is
73 See generallyJoNAKAIT, supra note 9, at 128-38 (describing the voir dire and an
attorney's right to challenge for cause a potential juror who may not be impartial);
SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: PSYCHO-
LOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 26 (1988) (noting that jurors are not tabula rasa in a pure
sense).
74 See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 3 (1966) (ob-
serving that the American legal system orders jurors "to carry out deliberations in
secret and to report out their final judgment without giving reasons for it"); KASSIN &
WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 73, at 9 (noting that jurors need not explain their decisions
and sometimes are not permitted to discuss improprieties that occur during
deliberation).
75 Cf Harry Kalven, Jr., The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19
OHIO ST. L.J. 158, 178 (1958) ("The judge and jury are two remarkably different insti-
tutions for reaching the same objective-fair, impersonal adjudication of controver-
sies. The judge represents tradition, discipline, professional competence and
repeated experience with the matter .... But the endless fascination of the jury is to
see whether something quite different-the layman amateur drawn from a wide pub-
lic . .. -can somehow work as well or perhaps better.").
76 See George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 705 (1997)
(noticing that the jury's "private and inarticulate decisionmaking protected it
from ... embarrassing public failures" and that "whether by tradition or conscious
design, the jury's verdict has been largely impenetrable. There never has been a
mechanism by which the defendant or anyone outside the system could command the
jury to reveal its decisionmaking processes. The jury's secrecy is an aid to legitimacy,
for the privacy of the jury box shrouds the shortcomings of its methods.").
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slanted-in a long series of cases-in favor of either Group A or
Group B, the prosecution can confidently anticipate that about half of
its cases will fall into Group A, with the remainder falling into Group
B. The prosecution is a long-run player. It has many cases and there-
fore can proceed on this assumption. For the prosecution, the rate of
convictions versus acquittals is the only thing that matters. 77 David,
however, has only his case to care about. This case determines his
fate. David therefore cannot be indifferent about the unknown sec-
ond-order probabilities. David's fear of this ambiguity forces him to
make a pessimistic assessment of the relevant probabilities. He conse-
quently increases the probability of the scenario in which his case falls
into Group A. According to David's pessimistic assessment, this sec-
ond-order probability is greater than 50%. This assessment has cru-
cial implications for David's plea bargaining position vis-a-vis the
prosecution. Before analyzing these implications, we complete our
discussion of ambiguity aversion as affecting the choice between
bench and jury trials.
Unlike juries, judges are committed to reasons that have gained
institutional endorsement and affirmation. 78 These reasons govern
and regularize the resolution of both legal and factual issues. A rea-
soned judgment manifests the judicial commitment to applying simi-
lar reasons in future cases. 79 For judges, treating like cases alike is
probably the most fundamental institutional commitment.80 Failure
to fulfill this commitment is considered institutionally unacceptable
and is likely to be criticized and corrected on appeal. Alignment with
the institutionally affirmed reasons is also in every judge's individual
interest. Failure to align with these reasons tags the judge as idiosyn-
cratic, which may adversely affect her reputation and promotion pros-
pects. A diversion from the institutional path also consumes greater
adjudicative efforts and resources than does the replication of a well
established institutional routine. Any such diversion increases the
judge's workload and keeps her dockets full.
The incentive to clear dockets and demonstrate efficiency also
induces judges to adjudicate cases evenhandedly. For example, if a
judge takes the prosecution's side in bench trials, defendants appear-
ing before that judge would take an exit by opting for jury trials. The
judge consequently would have to manage numerous jury trials. On
these trials she would expend more time and effort than on bench
77 Once again, we set high-profile cases aside. See supra note 2.
78 See Kalven, supra note 75, at 178.
79 See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 648-58 (1995).
80 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 225-75 (1986).
[VOL. 81:41514
2006] AMBIGUITY AVERSION AND THE CRIMINAL PROCESS
trials. Jury trials require extensive and elaborate case management on
the part of the judge. 81 They involve more ancillary litigation over
procedural and evidentiary issues than bench trials. 82 Jury trials there-
fore increase the judge's workload and reduce the number of cases
that she manages to close.8 3 The output reduction and the growing
backlog make the judge appear inefficient relative to her peers-a
factor likely to undermine the judge's reputation and career. Bench
trials enable the judge to both maintain and demonstrate efficiency in
closing cases. They also enable the judge to enhance her reputation
by producing impressive reasoned judgments. The defendant's right
to opt for a jury trial therefore induces judges not to engage in prac-
tices unattractive to criminal defendants. The prosecution's parallel
right induces judges not to develop practices that favor defendants
over the prosecution.8 4 These antipodal pressures generate judicial
evenhandedness.
To attain and exhibit evenhandedness, judges need to employ a
uniform set of reasons for their decisions. Absence of commitment to
such reasons signals to litigants that the judge is free to choose any
reason for deciding the case. This also indicates that the judge may
use her private reasons for making a decision. Such a judge exhibits
no commitment to evenhandedness. Facing such ajudge, the accused
or, alternatively, the prosecution is likely to opt for ajury trial. Adher-
ence to the institutionally affirmed reasons for decisions-the black
letter law and the conventional factfinding methodology-is therefore
in the interests of every individual judge. By adhering to these rea-
sons, the judge credibly commits herself to evenhandedness. A bench
trial before this judge consequently becomes an attractive alternative
to a trial by jury. The judge's adherence to institutional reasons also
enables litigants (more realistically, their lawyers) to compile a list of
her possible decisions and determine the probability of each decision.
This probability will generally be unambiguous.
This fundamental feature underscores the advantage of bench tri-
als over trials by jury. Jury verdicts can only be predicted in terms of
ambiguous probabilities. Ambiguous probabilities, however, provide
81 See Khanna, supra note 12, at 398 n.219.
82 See SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 12, at 445 tbl.5.43.
83 Dividing the jury-trial and the bench-trial caseloads between different judges
does not remove the judges' incentive to clear dockets. In the absence of a plea bar-
gain, judges in charge of jury trials would still have an incentive to elicit bench-trial
stipulations from prosecutors and defendants. The consequent increase in the num-
ber of bench trials would bring about a reassignment of the cases.
84 Judges have other strong incentives for not exercising a pro-defendant bias in
their decisions. See infra notes 262-63 and accompanying text.
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too slim a foundation for important decisions. Most people would
rather not depend upon such probabilities. A person's dependence
on an ambiguous probability induces pessimism about the actual
probability that attaches to his or her preferred scenario.8 5 The per-
son consequently reduces the probability of that scenario.8 6 In paral-
lel, the person increases the probability of the opposite scenario,
unfavorable to him or her.8 7 People making such probability adjust-
ments are ambiguity averse. As an empirical matter, ambiguity aver-
sion is a widespread cognitive phenomenon.8 8 As a normative matter,
aversion towards ambiguity is a rational epistemic attitude.8 9
To see why it is rational for a person to be ambiguity averse con-
sider the following example. David chooses between two lotteries.
The first lottery uses a box containing red and white balls that the
participants cannot see. The box is filled with these balls randomly by
an automatic feeder. The number of red and white balls in the box is
unknown. David will win this lottery and receive a $100 prize if he is
lucky enough to pull a red ball from the box. The second lottery is
similar to the first in every respect except one: its box contains fifty
red and fifty white balls. David knows about it (as do all other partici-
pants in the lottery). To participate in the first lottery, David needs to
purchase a $30 admission ticket. An admission ticket to the second
lottery costs $35. Both are bargain prices. By paying one of these
prices, a participant obtains an expected return in the amount of $50
(the $100 prize multiplied by the 50% probability of winning that
prize). David can only participate in one of these lotteries and, there-
fore, needs to choose between the two.
David does what many, if not most, ordinary people do. He pre-
fers Lottery II over Lottery I. In each of these lotteries, David's
probability of pulling out a red ball equals 50%. His expected payoff
thus appears to be $20 [(50% • $100) - $30] for Lottery I and $15
[(50% • $100) - $35] for Lottery II. This implies that David should
prefer Lottery I over Lottery II, but he does exactly the opposite.
Why?
David opts for a $15 payoff because its alternative-the $20 pay-
off-depends on a probability qualitatively inferior to the probability
85 See supra notes 38, 61-69 and accompanying text.
86 See supra notes 38, 61-69 and accompanying text.
87 See supra notes 38, 61-69 and accompanying text.
88 See supra notes 38, 61-69 and accompanying text; see also Terrence Chorvat et
al., Law and Neuroeconomics, 13 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 35, 51-52 (2005) (pointing out
that neurological evidence gives some explanation as to why people tend to be ambi-
guity averse).
89 See supra notes 38, 63-64.
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that he chooses to proceed upon. The 50% probability that attaches
to David's prospect of winning Lottery I is ambiguous. The 50%
probability that attaches to David's prospect of winning Lottery II is
not. This factor differentiates between the two probabilities and the
two lotteries. Chicago economist Frank Knight would have tagged
Lottery I an uncertain enterprise and Lottery II an enterprise under
risk.90 In philosophers' taxonomy, the 50% probability that attaches
to David's prospect of winning Lottery I is nonresilient and not
weighty.91 The 50% probability that attaches to David's prospect of
winning Lottery II is invariant.92 Therefore, it is both weighty and
sufficiently resilient to rely upon.93
The 50% probability that attaches to David's prospect of winning
Lottery I is nonresilient for a good reason. Virtually any addition of
information that affects David's prospect of winning Lottery I will
change this probability. The only addition of relevant information
that would keep this probability unchanged is one that demonstrates
that the box contains an equal number of red and white balls. This
additional information would align Lottery I with Lottery II. Without
this information, the probability attaching to David's prospect of win-
ning Lottery I still equals 50%. This probability, however, rests on a
problematic assumption. This assumption holds that the unknown in-
formation about the number of red and white balls in the lottery box
is not slanted. In reality, 70% of the balls in the box may either be red
or white, with the remaining 30% of the balls being, respectively,
white or red. Both scenarios appear equally plausible because there is
no evidence that affirmatively favors either of them. The two scena-
rios therefore cancel each other out, as do all other parallel scenarios
featuring an unequal distribution of red and white balls. David's
probability of winning Lottery I by drawing a red ball from the box
consequently equals 50%.
90 See KNicHT, supra note 64, at 19-20, 197-232 (distinguishing between random-
ness with knowable probabilities, conceptualized as "risk," and randomness with un-
knowable probabilities, conceptualized as "uncertainty").
91 See, e.g., JAMES LOGUE, PROJECTIVE PROBABILITY 78-95 (1995) (articulating the
concepts of"weight" and "resiliency," as applied to probabilities); Neil B. Cohen, Con-
fidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Imperfect Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 385, 397-400 (1985) (describing how a factfinder's confidence in the true value
of a given probability affects whether the burden of persuasion is satisfied by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence).
92 See ROBERT NOZICK, INVARIANCES: THE STRUCTURE OF THE OBJECTIVE WORLD
75-90, 99 (2001).
93 See Peter Gardenfors & Nils-Eric Sahlin, Unreliable Probabilities, Risk Taking and
Decision Making, 53 SYNTHESE 361, 361-63 (1982).
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This reasoning applies the principle of indifference, identified
earlier in this Article.9 4 As explained long ago by John Maynard
Keynes,
The Principle of Indifference asserts that if there is no known reason
for predicating of our subject one rather than another of several
alternatives, then relative to such knowledge the assertions of each
of these alternatives have an equal probability. Thus equal probabili-
ties must be assigned to each of several arguments, if there is an
absence of positive ground for assigning unequal ones.9 5
These observations explain why the ambiguity problem attaches
to Lottery I, but not to Lottery II. Lottery II involves a regular gam-
bling risk. Lottery I features a combination of gambling and episte-
mic risks. 9 6 David's willingness to give away $5 to eliminate the
epistemic risk exhibits his aversion towards ambiguity. Any amount
above $30 that David is ready to pay in order to participate in Lottery
II, as opposed to Lottery I, makes him ambiguity averse. David's aver-
sion towards ambiguity makes him pessimistic in assessing his
probability of winning Lottery I. David therefore reduces this
probability by 5% (from 50% to 45%). For him, the expected return
from Lottery I is therefore $15 [(45% • $100) - $30]-exactly the
same amount as in Lottery II.
David's ambiguity aversion is perfectly rational. Lottery I offers
its participants less information than does Lottery II. Expending $5
on information about the actual distribution of red and white balls in
the box is a good move, given the expected $15 gain that this move
brings about.
Ambiguity aversion and aversion towards risk are not the same.
Risk aversion relates to uncertain outcomes. Ambiguity aversion at-
taches to indeterminate probabilities. A prospect feared by a risk-
averse person does not become brighter when its ambiguous
probability, roughly estimated as 50%, turns into a probability that
unambiguously equals 50%. For an ambiguity-averse person, this
transformation makes a difference. A risk-neutral person is ready to
pay up to $50 to participate in Lottery II (assuming, of course, that the
bargain price of $35 is not on the table). For a risk-neutral person,
having $50 and having a 50% prospect of obtaining $100 are the
94 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
95 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TREATISE ON PROBABILITY 42 (1929). For a contem-
porary philosophical analysis of the indifference principle, see COHEN, supra note 1,
at 43-47.
96 See Gardenfors & Sahlin, supra note 93, at 364-73.
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same.9 7 When a person is only willing to pay less than $50 for the
right to participate in Lottery II, he or she is risk averse. 98 Inversely, a
person's readiness to pay more than $50 for participation in that lot-
tery makes him or her a risk lover.99 All this has nothing to do with
people's aversion towards ambiguity. A risk-neutral person may be
ambiguity averse. Any such person would prefer Lottery II over Lot-
tery I because Lottery II features an unambiguous probability. Being
pessimistic about ambiguous probabilities, such a person would re-
duce her probability of winning Lottery I. Correspondingly, she
would increase her probability of not winning that lottery. If that per-
son's ambiguity aversion is as intense as David's, she would only be
willing to pay $45 in order to participate in Lottery I. For that person,
the probability of winning Lottery I is 45% (50% minus the 5% deduc-
tion, impelled by the person's ambiguity aversion). Correspondingly,
the expected value that the person would ascribe to that lottery is $45
(45% - $100). Note, however, that this person still remains risk neu-
tral. She keeps that status by being willing to pay $50 for the right to
participate in Lottery II. If this person were averse towards risk, she
would be unwilling to pay this amount.1 0 0
For a risk-averse person, being a defendant in a criminal bench
trial and being a defendant in a criminal jury trial are equally bad
(assuming that the expected penalty is the same in both cases). An
ambiguity-averse person, however, would prefer a bench trial to a trial
by jury. He would act upon this preference not only when he is risk
averse, but also when he is risk neutral.
To relate our discussion to plea bargaining, we now demonstrate
how ambiguity aversion may become asymmetric. For that purpose,
we introduce another actor, Lee, who participates in thousands of lot-
teries identical to Lottery I. Unlike David, Lee pays the market price
for the right to participate in each lottery. The unknown information
about the distribution of the balls in each lottery box is not slanted in
any direction. In the long run, Lee therefore rationally expects to
97 See, e.g., RcRARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 10-11 (6th ed. 2003)
(explaining neutrality and aversion towards risk).
98 Id.
99 Id. at 11.
100 Formally, a person is risk averse when up(x) < u(px). In this formulation, u
represents the person's utility; x is the value of an asset that the person may obtain;
and p is the person's probability of obtaining that asset. This formulation portrays a
person who prefers px dollars in her pocket over the prospect of obtaining x dollars,
to which probability p attaches. A person is risk neutral but ambiguity averse when
up(x) = u(px), but only if p is unambiguous. If p is ambiguous, the person substitutes
it with a lower probability, say q, and the rest is the same as before: uq(x) = u(qx).
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recover $50,000 from 1,000 lotteries. For her, paying any amount be-
low $50,000 for the right to participate in those lotteries is attractive.
For that reason, Lee-a repeat player-is ready to pay any amount less
than $50 for the right to participate in any individual lottery. She
finds Michael, who only participates in a single Lottery I game, for
which he already paid $50. Michael made that payment before be-
coming averse towards ambiguity. Similarly to David, Michael esti-
mates his probability of winning Lottery I as 45%. For him, therefore,
the expected utility that this lottery brings about is $45. This means
that Michael expects to lose $5. Aware of all this, Lee offers Michael
to buy his right to participate in Lottery I for $47. Michael readily
accepts that offer. By this transaction Michael reduces his expected
disutility from -$5 to -$3. Michael, therefore, is happy about this trans-
action even though he knows that Lee exploited his ambiguity aver-
sion to increase her earnings. Michael, however, would have been
unhappy if he were compelled to participate in Lottery I and pay $50
for it. For obvious reasons, such compulsions are both unfair and
inefficient.
The setting in which Lottery I turns into a duty-and a person is
forced to pay $50 for participation in that lottery-is an abstract, but
nonetheless faithful, depiction of positive law. Jury trial is not a lot-
tery. But it does have a feature that makes it similar to Lottery I. This
feature is the inherently ambiguous probability of jury verdicts.
Under federal law and in many state jurisdictions, jury trial is obliga-
tory for defendants. 10 1 Defendants cannot opt for a bench trial unilat-
erally. For this wish to be granted, the prosecution needs to consent
to a bench trial and the judge needs to approve it.102 This arrange-
ment is unfair and potentially inefficient. This is so because the prose-
cution can opt for ajury trial and play against the defendant the same
strategy that Lee played against Michael. The prosecution is a repeat
player injury trials as much as Lee is a repeat player in Lottery I. We
now return to David and his criminal trial to demonstrate how the
prosecution can exploit its repeat-player advantage by forcing defend-
ants into unfavorable plea bargains.
II. EXPLOITING THE ASYMMETRY: THE PROSECUTION'S ABILITY To
FORCE DEFENDANTS INTO UNFAIR AND INEFFICIENT
PLEA BARGAINS
The prosecution indicts David for a felony punishable as follows:
101 See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
102 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a) (2)-(3) (conditioning the defendant's request for a
switch to a nonjury trial on the government's consent and the court's approval).
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1. Punishable by 120 months of imprisonment if the jury finds ag-
gravating circumstances (Crime A)
2. Punishable by 60 months of imprisonment if the jury finds no
aggravating circumstances (Crime B)
3. Punishable by 40 months of imprisonment if the jury finds miti-
gating circumstances (Crime C)
The jury can convict David of any of those crimes. In the past,
jurors have convicted 1/4 of defendants of Crime A, 1/4 of Crime B,
and 1/4 of Crime C. The remaining defendants (also 1/4) were ac-
quitted. No other information is available.
The prosecutor will attempt to establish that David committed
Crime A. Alternatively, she will attempt to establish that David com-
mitted either Crime B or Crime C. David will attempt to establish his
innocence. Alternatively, he will try to convince the jury to convict
him of Crime C or, in the worst scenario, of Crime B. The jury may
decide the case either way. Neither David nor the prosecutor has rea-
sons for holding one of these scenarios more likely than its alterna-
tives. David's situation can thus be analogized to a lottery box that
contains an unknown number of white, red, yellow, and pink balls
thrown in randomly by an automatic feeder. David must pick one of
the balls without seeing it. If he picks a white ball, he would be exon-
erated completely. Convictions for Crimes A, B, and C respectively
attach to red, yellow, and pink balls. David's probability of drawing a
white ball is 1/4, and the same goes for any other color. Similarly to
all other participants in this lottery-criminal defendants situated sim-
ilarly to him-David gambles against the prosecution. For him and
other defendants, this lottery is compulsory. Being a repeat player,
the prosecution has an assurance that 75% of all defendants will be
convicted: 1/4 will assume liability for Crime A; 1/4 for Crime B; and
1/4 for Crime C. The prosecution does not care whether these con-
victed defendants will include David. If David is not going to be
among these defendants, another defendant will replace him. For
David, however, as for any other individual defendant, there is only
one lottery which he will either win or lose.
David's expected penalty equals fifty-five months of imprison-
ment: (1/4 . 120) + (1/4 . 60) + (1/4 . 40) + (1/4 . 0). David knows
it, and the prosecution knows it too. David is ambiguity averse, a con-
dition that the prosecution is also well aware of. The prosecution of-
fers David a plea bargain that allows him to remove the Crime A
accusation by admitting the commission of Crime B. If accepted, this
bargain would send David to prison for sixty months. This punish-
ment exceeds David's expected penalty.
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David fears the ambiguity of the relevant probabilities. These
probabilities are not sufficiently weighty. Nor are they sufficiently re-
silient or invariant. Virtually any addition of information as to how
David's jurors might decide the case would change these probabilities.
In technical terms, David cannot rely on the general first-order
probabilities (1/4) that attach to each of his conviction and acquittal
scenarios. This is so because David does not know whether these
probabilities-as related to his individual case-are correct. This in-
formational void induces David to fear the worst scenario. This fear
prompts David to adjust the probability of his possible conviction of
Crime A upwards. To reflect his fear and ignorance, David sets this
probability on 1/3 and also modifies the probabilities of the remain-
ing scenarios. These modifications include the following:
1. David's probability of being convicted of Crime B is 1/3.
2. David's probability of being convicted of'Crime C is 1/6.
3. David's probability of being acquitted also happens to be 1/6.
Based on these estimations, David expects to go to prison for
sixty-seven months: (1/3 • 120) + (1/3 - 60) + (1/6 - 40) + (1/6 • 0).
For him, the prosecution's offer is attractive and he therefore accepts
it.
As a result of this plea bargain, David is convicted of a crime that
he probably did not commit and endures punishment that he does
not deserve. This outcome is both unjust and inefficient. David suf-
fers injustice because the state deliberately imposes on him an exces-
sive criminal sanction. 103 David's conviction is inefficient for two
reasons. Both reasons have to do with erroneous impositions of crimi-
nal liability. The first reason is the chilling effect generated by an
erroneous imposition of criminal liability. The prospect of being er-
roneously held liable for a crime discourages activities associated with
this prospect. Some of these chilled activities are socially beneficial.
For example, a civil servant facing the prospect of erroneous convic-
tion for taking bribes may decide to resign and seek other employ-
ment. The second reason is the erosion of the difference between
complying and not complying with the law. Facing an erroneous im-
103 See ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 172-78 (2005) (introducing
the "equal best" standard, under which a legal system can justifiably convict a person
only if it did its best in protecting that person from the risk of erroneous conviction
and if it does not provide better protection to other individuals); see also RONALD
DWORKIN, A MAnIER OF PRINCIPLE 72, 79-88 (1985) (explaining that a wrongful con-
viction of a person that is deliberate, rather than merely accidental, is unjust in that it
inflicts on the person a distinct moral harm; this harm is the person's discriminatory
treatment that violates the state's fundamental obligation to treat citizens with equal
concern and respect).
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position of criminal liability, a person may decide to avoid it by engag-
ing in a different criminal conduct that brings about a better tradeoff
between liability and benefits. 10 4 Consider again a civil servant who
faces the prospect of erroneous conviction for taking bribes. Assume
that the expected disutility associated with this prospect is -500 (this
amount is calculated by multiplying the person's probability of being
erroneously convicted by the applicable penalty and other repercus-
sions). 10 5 The person can eliminate this prospect by quitting his job.
The person, however, considers this alternative unattractive because it
produces a loss that exceeds 500 disutility units. The person therefore
considers another course of action: quitting the job after stealing a
large amount of money. This prospect promises the person the lowest
expected amount of disutility, say, -450.106 The person consequently
steals the money, which he would not do if his initial position-in
disutility units-were 0, rather than -500.107
The prosecution may exacerbate these deleterious effects by play-
ing a snowball strategy against defendants. David's ambiguity-averse
calculation makes him think that his expected punishment is sixty-
seven months of imprisonment. In negotiating plea bargains with de-
fendants situated similarly to David, the prosecution can push the ne-
gotiated penalty towards this upper limit. Using Crime B and its sixty
months jail term as a fallback standard for plea bargains, the prosecu-
tion may offer a pretrial bargain only to those defendants who agree
to a more severe punishment. Negotiations with other defendants can
be put on hold until their trials begin. For these defendants, sixty-
seven months of imprisonment will remain the expected punishment
(subject to unusual and unanticipated developments). Any such de-
fendant therefore will accept a sixty-month jail-term bargain in the eve
of the trial, should the prosecution offer him such a bargain. Some
defendants, however, will be willing to avoid trial and save their trial
expenses. They will opt for an early bargain with the prosecution.
104 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforce-
ment of Law, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 60-62 (2000) (drawing on Ivan P.L. Png,
Optimal Subsidies and Damages in the Presence of Judicial Error, 6 INT'L Rrv. L. & ECON.
101 (1986) (demonstrating formally that erroneous convictions dilute deterrence by
eroding the difference between the penalties expected from violating the law and
from not violating it)).
105 This disutility amount represents the person's losses of freedom, money, and
reputation brought about by his conviction and punishment.
106 The person calculates this amount by multiplying his probability of being ap-
prehended and convicted as a thief by the applicable punishments (both legal and
social). Subsequently, he reduces this negative sum (say, -1000) by the stolen amount
(say, 550).
107 We borrow this example from STEIN, supra note 103, at 106 n.85.
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These defendants will raise the going imprisonment rate for plea bar-
gains from sixty months to a longer period. The prosecution will sub-
sequently use the new rate as a fallback standard for new plea
bargains, offering a pretrial bargain only to those defendants who
agree to a more severe punishment. As previously, defendants stick-
ing to the going rate will be put on hold. The new imprisonment rate
will intensify the defendants' fear and the corresponding aversion to-
wards ambiguity. This dynamic will repeat itself again and again. Ulti-
mately, defendants will routinely plea bargain for sixty-seven months
in jail.
These scenarios are unlikely to materialize in a bench trial.
Bench trials are not as unpredictable as jury trials. There is no cer-
tainty that a judge will decide the case in some particular way. There
is, however, virtual certainty that the judge will decide the case by rea-
sons that are institutionally affirmed and generally accessible. As al-
ready explained, this commitment is credible enough to rely upon.10 8
This factor allows litigants and their attorneys to attach a determinate
probability to every decision that the judge may make. These
probability assessments are weighty, resilient, and invariant. These as-
sessments (the first-order probabilities) are likely to be correct. Their
probability of correctness (the second-order probability) is high as
well.
If David opted for a bench trial, he could depend on the
probabilities that attach to his conviction and acquittal scenarios.
Based on these probabilities, David could have predicted that the
judge is unlikely to find him guilty of Crime A. David also could have
predicted that the judge is unlikely to exonerate him completely. He
therefore would have estimated that the judge will be looking for a
midway solution. This reasoning could stabilize the relevant
probabilities for David and make them dependable. David therefore
would only have agreed to a plea bargain that offered him fifty-five
months of imprisonment or less. Aware of all the above factors, the
prosecution would probably have offered David such a bargain.
David's opting for a jury trial was a big mistake.
We underscore once again that the distortion from which David
suffers could not be produced by his possible aversion towards risk.
For a risk-averse defendant, there is no difference between being tried
by ajudge and being tried by ajury. When the expected penalty is the
same in both cases, ajury trial and a trial by a judge are equally suita-
ble. The defendant's probability of being acquitted by a judge still
remains weightier and more resilient than the probability of his ac-
108 See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
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quittal in a jury trial. This difference, however, only matters to ambi-
guity-averse defendants, not to defendants exhibiting aversion towards
risk alone.
Moreover, a defendant's aversion towards risk-as opposed to
ambiguity-is systematically reduced by a set of legal rules that mini-
mize the risk of erroneous conviction. This risk is reduced by the con-
stitutional requirement that the prosecution prove its case against the
defendant beyond all reasonable doubt. 10 9 This risk is also reduced
by the exclusion of hearsay and character evidence that the prosecu-
tion could otherwise offer to prove the defendant's guilt 1 0 and by the
defendant's general protection against unfair prejudice.I 1 Asymmet-
ric risk aversion therefore is only a problem for guilty defendants, and
justifiably so. Risk aversion does not constitute a serious problem for
innocent defendants because their risk of conviction is minimal. An
innocent defendant would hardly plea bargain for conviction when
the probability of his acquittal is both substantial and unambiguous
(as typically is the case in a bench trial). Asymmetric ambiguity aver-
sion, however, is a problem for innocent defendants. An innocent
defendant might plea bargain for conviction when the probability of
his acquittal is substantial but ambiguous (as typically is the case in a
jury trial).
As already explained, a defendant may be both risk neutral and
ambiguity averse. Facing a known risk, he may keep his optimism and
pessimism at a balance. For such a defendant, the expected penalty is
the highest sentence that he would plea bargain for. The same defen-
dant, however, becomes more pessimistic about the probability of his
acquittal when this probability is ambiguous. This defendant would
plea bargain for a sentence that exceeds the expected penalty. For
such defendants, innocent and guilty alike,1 12 the practical implica-
tions of our theory are substantial.
Finally, a defendant with aversion towards risk may also be ambi-
guity averse. Facing a criminal bench trial, such a defendant would
fear his conviction prospect more than justified by the expected pen-
alty (the probability of the defendant's conviction multiplied by the
109 See STEIN, supra note 103, at 172-78 (discussing the beyond-all-reasonable-
doubt requirement, its constitutional origin, and its minimizing effect on the risk of
erroneous conviction).
110 Id. at 183-208 (explaining the pro-defendant system of admissibility rules).
111 See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 137 (1968) (holding that Constitu-
tion requires courts to shield the defendant from any substantial spillover effect that
inadmissible evidence might produce).
112 We assume that there are good reasons for not convicting a guilty defendant
when the evidence does not warrant it.
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punishment). The defendant would consequently plea bargain for a
punishment that exceeds the expected penalty. He would, however,
agree to an even more severe punishment when facing a jury trial.
The probabilistic indeterminacy accompanying this trial mode would
expand the range of probabilities attaching to the defendant's convic-
tion. This expansion would further intensify the defendant's fear of
his conviction prospect. For such defendants, the practical implica-
tions of our theory are most significant as well.
III. OFFSETTING THE ASYMMETRY: THE RULE AGAINST DOUBLE
JEOPARDY, ASYMMETRIC APPEALS, AND THE RIGHT
TO GRAND JURY
Two mechanisms, both set by the Constitution's Fifth Amend-
ment, attenuate the effects of the asymmetric ambiguity aversion.
These mechanisms include the prohibition of double jeopardy' 13 and
the grand jury review of indictments. 114
The rule against double jeopardy prevents criminal retrial.1 15 Af-
ter facing the conviction prospect once, the defendant cannot face it
again in relation to the same offense. 116 In jury trials, jeopardy at-
taches when the jury is empaneled and sworn. 1 17 In bench trials,jeop-
ardy attaches after the first witness has taken oath."1 Subsequently, if
the prosecution fails to obtain conviction for whatever reason, except
for a mistrial'1 9 or its equivalents, 20 it cannot appeal. When the
judge makes a wrong decision in the defendant's favor-say, by erro-
neously ruling inadmissible the key prosecution's evidence-and the
jury subsequently acquits the defendant, this acquittal cannot be re-
113 See supra note 17.
114 See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
115 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 18, § 25.1 (a)-(c).
116 For the definition of the "same offence," see id. § 25.1(f). The treatise ex-
plains that, subject to separate-sovereign prosecutions, two offenses classify as similar
for double jeopardy purposes when their elements overlap each other completely. Id.
117 See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 38 (1978) ("The federal rule that jeopardy at-
taches when the jury is empaneled and sworn is an integral part of the constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy.").
118 SeeWillhauck v. Flanagan, 448 U.S. 1323, 1325-26 (1980); Crist, 437 U.S. at 37
n.15; Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975).
119 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 18, § 2 5 .1(g) (4). The mistrial needs to be justi-
fied as a "manifest necessity" or voluntarily consented to by the defendant. Id.
§ 25.2(a)-(c).
120 See Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1977) (noting that the critical
inquiry is whether the order entered ends all prosecution of the defendant for the
charge); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 18, § 25.2(0 (stating that Lee indicates that dismis-
sal is equivalent to mistrial in some circumstances).
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versed because the defendant can no longer be tried for the same
offense.12' A directed acquittal erroneously entered by the judge after
jeopardy had attached is also not appealable. 122 Such an acquittal
cannot even be reconsidered by the same judge, unless she entered it
expressly as a tentative decision open for reconsideration. 123 Simi-
larly, when the judge erroneously dismisses the charges afterjeopardy
had attached, this decision becomes final. It bars the defendant's re-
trial in the same way as do acquittals and convictions. 12 4
This doctrine creates an asymmetric appeal system. The prosecu-
tion cannot appeal against acquittals and dismissals of charges after
jeopardy has attached. Criminal defendants, however, can always ap-
peal against their convictions. 125 This system skews trial errors in a
pro-defendant direction.126 Errors that benefit defendants vastly out-
number the pro-prosecution errors.127
This dynamic evolves in the following way. For reasons already
given,' 28 trial judges fear reversals and seek to avoid them. 129 The
reversal prospect depends on appeals. Trial judges therefore tend to
reduce both the number of appeals targeting their decisions and the
appeals' chances to succeed. Because the prosecution generally can-
not appeal, the trial judge's best strategy to avoid reversal is to resolve
every contestable legal issue in the defendant's favor. 130 The judge
121 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 18, § 25.3(b).
122 See Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 63-78 (1978); see also LAFAVE ET AL.,
supra note 18, § 25.3(c) (discussing Sanabria).
123 See Smith v. Massachusetts, 125 S. Ct. 1129, 1135-38 (2005).
124 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 18, § 25.3(a).
125 See Stith, supra note 19, at 8-14 (describing the asymmetric system of criminal
appeals under the double-jeopardy prohibition).
126 Id. at 19-24.
127 Id. at 17.
128 These reasons virtually guarantee judges' alignment with the institutional crite-
ria for decisionmaking. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
129 See POSNER, supra note 97, at 543 (noting that judges are prestige maximizers
and are sensitive to being reversed by a higher court); Richard A. Posner, Judicial
Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1259, 1271
(2005) (mentioning reversal rate amongst indicators ofjudicial promotion-affecting
performance and stating that " [ ]udges also do not like to be reversed, even though a
reversal has no tangible effect on a judge's career if he is unlikely to be promoted to
the court of appeals in any event" (footnote omitted)); see also Emery G. Lee III,
Horizontal Stare Decisis on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 92 Ky. L.J. 767, 771
(2004) (noting thatjudges "may fear reversal by a higher court and may harbor ambi-
tions for higher office").
130 To avoid reputational damage, the judge needs to remain unbiased in resolv-
ing issues settled by bright-line rules. This strategy will keep the judge's decisions
within the bounds of societal and professional acceptability.
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consequently introduces a pro-defendant bias in sampling precedent
and in applying the law-evidence law in particular-to the case at
hand.13' From the conflicting upper-court decisions, she selects the
decision that favors the defendant. 132 For example, in ruling on the
admissibility of the defendant's confession under the "voluntariness"
standard,133 the judge interprets the "totality of circumstances" that
determines the issue' 34 in the light most favorable to the defen-
dant. 35 The fear of reversal prompts judges to exercise the same bias
in hearsay rulings; for example, in deciding whether an assertion im-
plied from a person's conduct was "intentional" and therefore consti-
tutes hearsay.13 6 Hearsay rulings and determination of confessions'
"voluntariness" are representative examples of many court decisions
that practically determine the outcome of the trial. Together with the
precedent sampling that systematically favors defendants, the indis-
criminate pro-defendant slant in these and other evidential rulings pro-
duces an unjustified reduction in the general rate of convictions. 137
This reduction is different from the effect of other procedural and
evidential rules-such as the criminal proof standard-that rationally
account for the possibility of innocence.
131 See Stith, supra note 19, at 18-24, 36-42 (describing and analyzing this ten-
dency along with its partial mitigation by the judges' incentive to preserve some legal
issues for appellate review).
132 See id. at 20-21 (describing and analyzing the pro-defendant bias in the trial
judges' sampling of precedents).
133 At common law and under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the defendant's confession is only admissible when made "voluntarily." See
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 18, § 6.2(b)-(c).
134 See id. § 6.2(c) (stating and illustrating the principle requiring judges to ex-
amine the "totality of circumstances" surrounding each confession in determining
whether the defendant made it "voluntarily").
135 See Stith, supra note 19, at 9-12 (explaining how overestimating or underesti-
mating the voluntariness of a confession results in a pro-government or pro-defen-
dant error).
136 See FED. R. EVID. 801 (a) (2) (defining "statement" that may fall under the defi-
nition of "hearsay" as including "nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by
the person as an assertion").
137 See Stith, supra note 19, at 50. Vikramaditya Khanna argues that the asymmet-
ric appeal system actually induces the prosecution to prosecute the defendant more
zealously by expending on the trial more efforts and other resources than it would
expend if it could appeal against acquittals and dismissals (after jeopardy had at-
tached). Khanna, supra note 12, at 374. We do not see, however, how the availability
of appeal changes the prosecution's incentive to do its very best at the trial. The
prosecution's underperformance at the trial would reduce its chances to succeed on
appeal. An appellant can only complain about the judge's errors, not about the flaws
in his or her own trial performance.
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Arguably, trial judges can offset this probability reduction by in-
troducing a pro-prosecution bias in their discretionary rulings. These
rulings are generally immune from the appellate review.' 38 In making
them, trial judges therefore need not fear reversal. These rulings ad-
mit and exclude crucial evidence. They balance evidence's probative
value against its prejudicial effect;' 3 9 determine whether an expert's
testimony is sufficiently reliable under the Daubert criteria; 40 and
these, once again, are just the most salient examples of the trial
judges' discretionary decisions to which appellate courts defer.
Despite this deference, slanting discretionary decisions in the
prosecution's favor would not be in the judges' interest. First, to the
extent it exhibits a systematic bias, this slanting may in the end trigger
the appellate court's intervention. Second, judges care about their
reputation.141 An unscrupulous pro-prosecution slanting of a judge's
discretionary decisions might damage her reputation. Finally, trial
judges do not only want to avoid reversals. As already mentioned, they
also want to reduce the number of appeals against their decisions. A
138 Appellate courts reverse such rulings only upon finding an "abuse of discre-
tion" by the trial judge, typically defined as "'an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or
manifestly unreasonable judgment.'" United States v. Hernandez-Herrera, 952 F.2d
342, 343 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528, 1530
(10th Cir. 1989)); see also United States v. Gabaldon, 389 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir.
2004).
139 See FED. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."); Henandez-Herrera, 952 F.2d
at 343 (applying a deferential standard to the question of authentication of evidence);
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 174 (3d ed. 2003) ("Trial
judges are given broad discretion in applying FRE 403. It is generally held that their
rulings are entitled to 'substantial deference' on appeal and are reversed only for
'clear abuse' of discretion."); see also FED. R. E'ID. 609(a) ("[E]vidence that an ac-
cused has been convicted of ... a crime shall be admitted [to impeach him as a
witness] if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused ...."); United States v. Martinez-Marti-
nez, 369 F.3d 1076, 1088 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Evidentiary rulings under Fed.R.Evid. 609
are reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard."); United States v. Jimenez, 214
F.3d 1095, 1097-98 (9th Cir. 2000) ("The district court's evidentiary rulings under
Rule 609(a) are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.").
140 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-95 (1993) (laying
down a set of reliability-based criteria for determining the admissibility of scientific
expert testimony); see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999)
(extending Daubert's gatekeeping criteria to all kinds of expert testimony). The stan-
dard for reviewing Daubert rulings on appeal is abuse of discretion. See Gen. Elec. Co.
v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 138-39 (1997).
141 See POSNER, supra note 97, at 543.
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large number of defendants' appeals may undermine the judge's rep-
utation for evenhandedness. Also, the greater the number of appeals
against the judge's decisions, the greater the chances that one such
appeal will succeed. 142 An increase in the number of appeals makes
the judge's reversal prospect more probable than before. 143 Finally, a
judge's reputation as biased in the prosecution's favor would induce
defendants to opt for jury trials-a costly consequence that judges
generally want to avoid. Trial judges therefore are unlikely to slant
their discretionary decisions in the prosecution's favor. The unmer-
itorious reduction of the conviction rate therefore stays uncut.144
Prosecutors and defendants take this general probability reduc-
tion into account. This probability reduction affects plea bargains.
Notjustified by the merits, this probability reduction makes the defen-
dant's conviction prospect less likely than it should be. This reduction
therefore counterbalances the upward adjustment that an ambiguity-
averse defendant introduces into his probability of being convicted by
the jury. The extent to which it does so is unclear. Complete setoff
does not appear to be a realistic possibility.
The grand jury mechanism abates the effects of the asymmetric
ambiguity aversion in a different way. This mechanism disambiguates
the defendant's probability of being convicted by the jury. 145 The re-
sulting disambiguation, however, is only partial.
142 As observed by Kate Stith, "The dynamic effect of the one-way pressure on
appellate courts also tends to move appellate law inexorably in a pro-defendant direc-
tion." Stith, supra note 19, at 26-27.
143 See id. at 26.
144 The asymmetric-ambiguity-aversion problem can be mitigated by any indis-
criminate reduction of the conviction rate. The rule against double jeopardy, how-
ever, is the only legal mechanism that has this effect. All other rules of criminal
procedure and evidence separate between the guilty and the innocent. See, e.g.,
DanielJ. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Game-Theoretic
Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARv. L. REV. 430, 467-70 (2000) (demon-
strating that the right to silence induces guilty criminals not to pool with innocents by
making false exculpatory statements).
145 We assume that the grand jury adequately performs its role. This normative
assumption is supported by empirical facts. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625,
634 (2002) ("Respondents emphasize that the Fifth Amendment grand jury right
serves a vital function in providing for a body of citizens that acts as a check on
prosecutorial power. No doubt that is true."); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 18, § 15.3(b)
(demonstrating that grand jurors generally perform their screening role). Another
view maintains that grand jurors rubberstamp the prosecution's indictment requests.
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Stewart, 545 N.Y.S.2d 974, 977 n.1 (Sup. Ct. 1989)
("Many lawyers and judges have expressed skepticism concerning the power of the
Grand Jury. This skepticism was best summarized by the Chief Judge of this state in
1985 when he publicly stated that a Grand Jury would indict a 'ham sandwich."'); Do
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The grand jury must have sixteen to twenty-three members on
the panel. 146 These members must collectively decide whether to re-
turn an indictment against the defendant. 147 If twelve grand jurors or
more agree about issuing an indictment, the defendant can be in-
dicted. 148 Absence of such an agreement blocks the initiation of crim-
inal proceedings against the defendant. 149 The grand jury scrutinizes
the prosecution's decision to indict the defendant I 50 by considering
the prosecution's evidence I5 I and by conducting its own investiga-
tions.1 52 The grand jury's investigative powers include the authority to
subpoena witnesses and compel the production of both documentary
and physical evidence. 53
The indicted defendant can estimate his prospects in the forth-
coming jury trial by using the grand jury's decision as a straw-vote.
Grand jurors are selected from the same community as trial jurors. 154
They are generally as representative as trialjurors. 155 The grand jury's
decision therefore forecasts the future decision of the trial jury. The
defendant can rely on this forecast after obtaining the results of the
grand jurors' vote. These results help the defendant to determine his
probability of being convicted by the trial jury. For example, when
the indictment is endorsed by twenty-two out of twenty-three grand
jurors, the defendant's probability of being convicted by the trial jury
We Need Grand Juries ?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1985, at A16 (reporting former New York
Chief Judge Wachtler's call for an abolition of grand juries because "[t]hey would
'indict a ham sandwich' if the district attorney asked nicely"); see also Niki Kuckes, The
Useful, Dangerous Fiction of Grand Jury Independence, 41 AM. CRIM. L. R-v. 1, 33-55,
60-62 (2004) (arguing that grandjury independence is a fiction that enhances inves-
tigative powers, shields the exercise of prosecutorial discretion from judicial over-
sight, streamlines pretrial procedures, and distorts the public debate about the
protective screening of prosecutions).
146 FED. R. CRiM. P. 6(a)(1).
147 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 18, § 8.1(a).
148 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(f).
149 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(f).
150 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 18, § 8.1 (a) (stating the grand jury's prosecution-
screening role).
151 Id.
152 Id. §§ 8.3-.4 (specifying the grand jury's investigative powers); see also id.
§ 8.4(b), at 411 (noting that in most jurisdictions the grand jury has the "authority to
undertake an investigation on its own initiative notwithstanding the prosecutor's
disagreement").
153 Id. § 8.3(a)-(c).
154 Id. § 8.4(a), at 409 ("Today, in all but a handful ofjurisdictions, the grand jury
array is drawn from the same constituency, and selected in the same manner, as the
array for the petit jury.").
155 Id.
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is fairly high. This probability is fairly low when only twelve out of
twenty-three grand jurors support the indictment.
The defendant is generally entitled to obtain the grand jury's vot-
ing score. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(c) requires the
foreperson or another designated grand juror to record the number
of jurors concurring in every indictment and file the record with the
court. The rule also provides that "the record may not be made pub-
lic unless the court so orders,"15 6 but federal courts tend to allow de-
fendants to inspect it under the Bullock rule. 157 This rule underscores
the defendant's right to verify the indictment's endorsement by the
requisite majority of grand jurors.1 58 As emphasized in one of the de-
cisions that followed Bullock, "[a] n accused is entitled... to be satis-
fied that the indictment was in fact concurred in by twelve or more
grand jurors, and was not merely a formal instrument signed only by
the foreman." 1 59
The Bullock rule operates alongside the secrecy requirements 160
that lie at the heart of the grand jury process. 161 These requirements
make grand jury proceedings secret and prevent their disclosure (sub-
ject to a few carefully drafted exceptions). 162 Driven by secrecy con-
cerns, some courts have declined to follow Bullock and its progeny.
156 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(c).
157 See United States v. Bullock, 448 F.2d 728, 729 (5th Cir. 1971) ("Under the
rationale of Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966).... the defendant should
have been accorded the right to inspect the required record or, if such record was not
properly maintained, as required by the rule, to have access to some method of substi-
tuted proof to ascertain that the substantive provisions of Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(f) were
met.").
158 Id.; see also United States v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 345 F. Supp. 410, 421 (E.D. La.
1972) (reaffirming the Bullock procedure of examining the grand jurors' "concur-
rence slip" by the defendant (internal quotation marks omitted)).
159 United States v. Benigno, No. 76 Cr. 0603, 1976 WL 852, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6,
1976); see also United States v. Marshall, 526 F.2d 1349, 1359-60 (9th Cir. 1976) (up-
holding the government's agreement to allow the defendant to inspect "the grand
jury ballot and the return indicating the number of jurors concurring in the indict-
ment" as aligning with Bullock); State v. CIBA-GEIGY Corp., 536 A.2d 1299, 1301 (NJ.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (noting that defendants were allowed to inspect the voting
and attendance records of the grand jury to verify the validity of the indictment).
160 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
161 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 18, § 8.5(a) (underscoring the centrality of the
secrecy requirement in grand jury proceedings).
162 See FED. R. C~iM. P. 6(e) (2)-(3) (stating the secrecy requirement and its excep-
tions); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 18, § 8.5 (analyzing the secrecy requirement and its
exceptions).
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They held that the grand jury's voting score can be disclosed to the
defendant only upon a showing of particularized need. I63
The grand jury's standard for returning an indictment is "proba-
ble cause" 164 or, alternatively, "prima facie evidence.' 65 There are no
practical differences between these standards, 166 as contrasted with
the Minnesota instruction which tells grand jurors that they are au-
thorized not to indict the defendant "if [they] do not feel there is a
reasonable prospect of a conviction." 16 7 Both standards allow the
grand jury to indict the defendant without conducting an in-depth
examination of the evidence. This factor turns many grand jury deci-
sions to indict into a weak predictor of the defendant's probability of
conviction. The decision's predictive capacity would depend on the
voting score. When the grand jurors decide to indict unanimously,
the defendant's probability of conviction remains indeterminate.
However, when only a slim majority of grand jurors (say, twelve out of
twenty-three) support the indictment, the probability of conviction is
generally low. The desired disambiguation can only be achieved when
grand jurors receive-and follow-the Minnesota (or similar)
instruction.
163 See United States v. Deffenbaugh Indus., Inc., 957 F.2d 749, 757 (10th Cir.
1992) ("If Bullock and the other authorities citing that opinion stand for the proposi-
tion that defendants are always entitled to view the report of the foreman of the grand
jury specifying the number of votes for the indictment, we respectfully disagree. We
do believe defendants are entitled to the assurance of the district judge that the judge
has inspected the report and it contains twelve or more votes to indict. But anything
more, except upon a showing of particularized need, would negate Rule 6(c)'s re-
quirement of secrecy absent an 'order of the court.'"); see also United States v. Missler,
299 F. Supp. 1268 (D. Md. 1969), afftd, 427 F.2d 1369 (4th Cir. 1970). In Missler, the
grand jury's voting record, documenting the fact that all twenty-three jurors con-
curred in the indictment, was disclosed to the defendant. Id. at 1270. The district
court noted, however, that "[i]f the point is raised in any future case, the court will
advise the defendant only that 12 or more jurors concurred in finding the indictment
in order to preserve the secrecy provided for by Rule 6." Id. at 1270 n.3.
164 See United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1186-87, 1196-98 (9th Cir.
2005) (stating that "probable cause" is the generally accepted standard for the grand
jury's indictment decisions).
165 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 18, § 15.2(0, at 742 (explaining that, under the
"'prima facie evidence standard,'" grand jurors are instructed to indict the defendant
"'when all the evidence taken together, if unexplained or uncontradicted, would war-
rant [his] conviction'").
166 Id.
167 See supra note 22.
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IV. EMPIRICAL CONFIRMATIONS
This Part tests our theory against empirical data. This testing is
necessary for two reasons. First, it is important to know whether ac-
tual criminal defendants are ambiguity averse with respect to their
prospects in jury trials, as contrasted with bench trials. Second, our
theory's fundamental premise might face an empirical objection. Ar-
guably, the extent to which jury trials are predictable does not much
differ from the extent to which an informed insider can predict the
outcomes of bench trials. 168 This objection branches into two antipo-
dal claims. The first of those claims holds that bench and jury trials
are both unpredictable. A bench trial's outcome depends upon what
the judge had for breakfast, 69 and jury verdicts are equally whimsical
and random. 170 According to the second claim, jury and bench trials
are both reasonably predictable. To the proponents of those claims,
institutional reasons for decisions-to which judges are committed
and juries are not-do not mean much. Empirical facts are the only
thing that matters. Arguably, theoretical models in which attorneys
make reliable predictions about the outcomes of bench trials, but are
unable to make such predictions about jury verdicts, do not align with
these facts.
But how are we to find the empirical facts? Asking trial attorneys
about their ability to predict judges' and juries' decisions is not a good
methodology. Successful trial attorneys tend to relate their success to
skills rather than serendipity. Many of them might therefore tell you
that a good attorney is generally able to predict the outcomes of both
jury and bench trials. An unsuccessful attorney, in contrast, tends to
blame his or her underachievement on the system. He or she might
tell you that the adjudication system is whimsical or even corrupt. De-
termining the attorneys' (and their clients') revealed preferences 171
for jury over bench trials, or vice versa, therefore appears to be meth-
odologically more adequate than polling. Deeds speak louder than
words. What is chosen most often: jury trials or bench trials?
This approach faces difficulties. It identifies individuals' prefer-
ences for a particular mode of trial (bench or jury), but not the moti-
168 Our premise that jury trials are unpredictable, relative to bench trials, gains
support from scholarly writings. See supra notes 49, 55, 74, 76. The empirical objec-
tion to our theory therefore runs against these writings as well.
169 See DWORKIN, supra note 80, at 36.
170 See FRANK, supra note 49, at 172.
171 Under the standard economic definition, revealed preference is a product-in-
duced change in consumer behavior evidenced by the consumers' willingness (or un-
willingness) to purchase the product. See KELVIN LANCASTER, MODERN ECONOMICS:
MICROECONOMICS 121-22 (1973).
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vations underlying those preferences. These motivations are diverse.
They complicate the analysis of defendants' and prosecutors' trial-
mode preferences. A defendant may opt for a bench trial not because
he is ambiguity averse, but for an altogether different reason. Being
indifferent between the two trial formats, he may prefer a bench trial
because it is much faster and less costly than a trial byjury. 172 Further-
more, opting for a predictable bench trial before a prosecution-
minded judge is still better than litigating the case before hostile ju-
rors. For example, a defendant accused of shooting a police officer
may prefer a bench trial because he fears that, after September 11, the
jury will convict him, no matter what. 173
A trial's predictability is one of several reasons for selecting the
trial mode. The defendant's desire to avoid conviction and harsh
punishment dominates this reason. Defendants generally prefer an
unpredictable jury trial to a likely defeat in a bench trial. Facing a
predictable conviction by a judge, a defendant opts for a jury trial
even when he is ambiguity averse. 174 Because a bench trial holds a
virtually certain prospect of conviction, there is no downside for the
defendant in trying his luck with a jury. By making this gamble the
defendant incurs trial expenses and assumes the risk of the judge's
retaliation at sentencing. For some defendants, the acquittal prospect
that they carry with the jury offsets these costs. Amid the different
selection effects complicating the revealed-preferences' analysis, this
effect is most significant. Our theory takes it into account by predict-
ing the prevalence ofjury trials for jurisdictions in which the prosecu-
tion prosecutes only "sure cases" where the defendant's conviction is
virtually certain. Such jurisdictions usually have a relatively low trial
rate and a relatively high rate of guilty pleas. Most importantly, in the
minority of cases that go to a bench trial the rate of acquittals is much higher
than in jury trials. Defendants with tangible acquittal prospects
predominantly prefer a bench trial over a trial by jury. Our theory
anticipates most defendants to be ambiguity averse. No such defen-
dant would want his acquittal prospect to depend on the jury decision.
The vast majority of defendants opting for a jury trial would therefore
172 This defendant also may rationally hope that he would be sentenced with some
leniency, if convicted, because he saved the judge's time-a factor that the judge
would count in his favor. See supra note 34 and accompanying text; see also Bibas,
supra note 3, at 2486 ("The Federal Sentencing Guidelines significantly discount the
sentences of defendants who accept responsibility in a timely manner, typically by
pleading guilty.").
173 See State v. Burks, 674 N.W.2d 640, 642 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003).
174 See Viscusi & Chesson, supra note 62, at 167 (demonstrating that people gener-
ally seek ambiguity when confronted with a high probability of loss).
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be those whose prospects of acquittal are slim at best. These defend-
ants would try to raise a doubt that jurors (as opposed to judges)
might consider "reasonable." Most jurors would still not buy it. The
acquittal rate injury trials would consequently be markedly lower than
in bench trials.
Another factor complicating the revealed-preferences' analysis is
the prosecution's ability to veto the defendant's request for a bench
trial. In most jurisdictions, defendants cannot unilaterally elect to
have a bench trial.175 To have a bench trial, a defendant needs to
obtain the prosecution's consent and the court's approval.1 76 This re-
quirement makes the chosen trial format not indicative of the defen-
dant's preference. Under our theory, for example, the prosecutor
extracts better plea bargains (from the narrow prosecutorial perspec-
tive) by opting for a trial by jury systematically. The prosecutor only
agrees to a bench trial in exchange for some concession by the defen-
dant (that is, in exchange for a plea bargain). This factor distorts the
defendants' trial-mode preferences.
Prosecutors and judges often act as repeat players in relation to
each other. When that happens, the prosecutor wants to maintain a
good working relationship with the judge. This induces the prosecu-
tor to opt for bench trials in order to reduce the judge's backlog of
cases. This incentive often overrides the prosecutor's ambition to
force harsh plea bargains upon ambiguity-averse defendants. Defend-
ants' expectation that the judge will reciprocate may motivate some of
them to opt for ajury trial; others would be driven into plea bargains,
favorable and unfavorable. For these reasons, jurisdictions with low trial
rates do not generate case samples tidy enough for identifying the defendants'
trial-mode preferences. The low trial rate makes this identification diffi-
cult. The defendants' distorted choices in plea bargains and in select-
ing the trial mode make it virtually impossible.
Jurisdictions with high trial rates offer our investigation the most
promising dataset potential. High trial rates indicate absence of rigor-
ous case screening by the prosecution, as well as the defendants' abil-
ity to withstand illegitimate plea bargaining pressures. High-trial-rate
jurisdictions consequently exhibit trial-mode preferences that are
largely systematic and undistorted. Facing trial in one such jurisdic-
tion, a defendant does not accept a plea bargain when the evidence
pointing to his guilt is not strong enough. When the defendant is also
ambiguity averse-as usually is the case, according to our theory-he
prefers a bench trial over a trial by jury. When the evidence pointing
175 See supra notes 14-15, 26-27 and accompanying text.
176 See supra notes 14-15, 26-27 and accompanying text.
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to the defendant's guilt is substantial, he generally accepts a plea bar-
gain. The qualifier "generally" accounts for defendants who demand
overly lenient sentences in exchange for their guilty pleas. To this the
prosecution does not agree. The defendants consequently have to se-
lect the trial mode best fitting their objectives. Bench trials offer such
defendants no hope. For reasons already stated, many of them there-
fore take their chances with the jury-because of its unpredictability.
These defendants turn into ambiguity seekers. Some defendants opt
for a jury trial strategically, hoping that their time-wasting threat will
induce the prosecutor to offer an attractive plea bargain.
Defendants opting for a bench trial are unlikely to be vetoed by
the prosecution even when the law allows it. A high-trial-rate environ-
ment increases the prosecution's workload and the judges' backlog.
As already explained, an average jury trial consumes more time and is
more effort intensive than an average bench trial. 177 A substantial in-
crease in the number ofjury trials multiplies this difference. This fac-
tor induces prosecutors to accept the bench-trial format even when
they favor the jury-trial environment. Their position as repeat players,
interested in bonding with judges, is yet another factor supporting our
"no veto" prediction. A high-trial-rate environment places judges
under pressure and induces them to clear dockets as expediently as
possible. This inducement turns bench trial into the judges' default
trial mode. Acting upon this inducement, judges do not merely wel-
come bench trials. They actively encourage them. Prosecutors are
unlikely to resist this pressure even when they are ready to risk their
working relationship with the judge. Judges consider themselves capa-
ble of adjudicating any factual or legal issue. For this reason (that
occasionally blends with resentment), a judge might perceive the
prosecutor's insistence on a jury trial as a strategic attempt to obtain
an unfair advantage. Few prosecutors, if any, can afford this bad sig-
nal. No prosecutor wants her case against the defendant to appear
suspicious in the judge's eyes.
Our theory ascribes ambiguity aversion to a paradigmatic crimi-
nal defendant. Empirically, this means that most criminal defendants
are ambiguity averse. When such a defendant goes to trial in which
his acquittal prospect is real, he prefers to be tried by a judge rather
than jury. He takes his chances with unpredictable jurors only when
the evidence leaves him no acquittal prospect in a predictable bench
trial. Most such cases end up in guilty pleas and plea bargains. They
do not go to trial. Our theory therefore predicts that bench trials are preva-
lent in jurisdictions in which trial rates are high. To repeat: in cases in
177 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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which the prosecution's evidence is not overwhelmingly strong, de-
fendants predominantly prefer a bench trial. In jurisdictions featur-
ing high trial rates and, correspondingly, a nonmeticulous case
selection by the prosecution, there will be many such cases.
Ambiguity aversion is the only adequate explanation of this pref-
erence. Defendants not averse towards ambiguity are indifferent to
the trial format. They choose bench and jury trials interchangeably.
They are not likely to face pressures from the bench strong enough to
dictate to them the waiver of a jury trial. Indeed, the law generally
requires trial judges to advise the defendant that he is entitled to a
trial byjury. 178 Failure to do so-let alone a pressure that impels the
defendant to agree to a bench trial-may invalidate a guilty plea.179
A defendant with no aversion towards ambiguity is unlikely to
change his mind after choosing a jury trial. Neither the prosecution
nor the defendant's own attorney can induce him to do it. The prose-
cution scarcely has any leverage against a defendant who goes to trial
after refusing (or without negotiating) a plea bargain. Defense attor-
neys often develop repeat-player incentives vis-A-vis prosecutors and
judges, with whom they want to bond.1 80 Acting upon this incentive,
some attorneys may convince their clients to accept a plea bargain. 81
Yet, persuading a client who claims to be innocent to switch from a
jury to a bench trial is an entirely different matter. Few defense attor-
neys would assume such a risk. Few defendants, if any, would suc-
cumb to this pressure. Defendants opting for a trial by jury do so
strategically or because they perceive jury trial as a norm. In either
case, they are not easily persuaded to switch to a trial before a judge.
Defendants opting for a bench trial are typically driven by their
ambiguity aversion. When bench trials are prevalent and the general
trial rate is high, defendants who choose a bench trial are predomi-
nantly averse towards ambiguity. Empirical data that we now specify
confirm these predictions.
178 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (b) (1) (C) (requiring the court to advise the defendant
entering a guilty plea of his right to ajury trial); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243
(1969).
179 See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242-44. But see LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 18, § 21.4(e)
(explaining the Boykin decision as unique and stating the prevalent approach that
favors an ad hoc inquiry into whether the defendant's plea was voluntary and
intelligent).
180 See Bibas, supra note 3, at 2475, 2480 (underscoring this incentive).
181 Id. at 2480.
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According to the National Center for State Courts, the general
trial rate is approximately 3%.182 Most criminal cases-about 97%-
are disposed by courts without a trial.18 3 The most prevalent case dis-
position-about 63% of the total number of cases-is guilty plea. 8 4
About 21% of the total number of cases are dismissed. 85 Finally,
about 13% of the total number of cases fail to produce conviction for
different (unspecified) reasons that include a mistrial.' 8 6 In this
dataset, jurisdictions with the highest trial rates almost uniformly exhibit the
prevalence of bench trials. In 1998, these jurisdictions included Arkansas
(about 10% trial rate), Wyoming (about 13%) and the District of Co-
lumbia (about 10%).187 As our theory predicts, about 84% of Arkan-
sas trials were bench trials.' 8 8 About 73% of Wyoming trials were
bench trials. 189 Exceptionally, bench trials in the District of Columbia
accounted for only 3%.190 In 1999, Arkansas was again among the
three highest-trial-rate jurisdictions. Its trial rate was 8.4%.191 About
82% of all Arkansas trials were resolved by judges. 19 2 Puerto Rico
topped the list with a 9% trial rate and with remarkable 96% of bench
trials (only 4% of the litigated criminal cases went to juries). 193 Ex-
ceptionally, West Virginia, with a trial rate of about 8%, exhibited the
prevalence of jury trials.' 94 There, bench trials accounted for about
45% of all trials.195 Most trials-about 55%-were jury trials.' 96
182 This rate was reported for years 1999 and 2002. In 2000 and 2001, it was 3.3%
and 2.8%, respectively. In 1998, it was 3.7%. See NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAM-
INING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 1998, at 72 (Brian J. Ostram & Neal B. Kauder,
eds., 1999) [hereinafter STATE COURTS 1998]; NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMIN-
ING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 1999-2000, at 68 (Brian J. Ostram et al. eds., 2001)
[hereinafter STATE COURTS 2000]; NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE
WoRK OF STATE COURTS, 2001, at 63 (Brian J. Ostram et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter
STATE COURTS 2001]; NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE
COURTS, 2002, at 61 (Brian J. Ostram et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter STATE COURTS
2002]; NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2003,
at 44 (Brian J. Ostram et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter STATE COURTS 2003].
183 This datum reflects the five year period from 1998 to 2002. See sources cited
supra note 182.
184 See sources cited supra note 182.
185 See sources cited supra note 182.
186 See sources cited supra note 182.
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The statistics for the year 2000 did not include Arkansas. This
time around, the list of high-trial-rate jurisdictions was topped by Ha-
waii. The Hawaii trial rate was about 13%.197 For such exceptionally
high trial rates, our theory predicts an unequivocal dominance of the
bench trial format. Correspondingly with our theory, 73% of Hawaii
trials were bench trials1 98 (as opposed to only 17% in 1999199). Pu-
erto Rico again exhibited a 9% trial rate. 200 As in 1999, its bench-trial
rate was about 96%.201 The overall trial rate in West Virginia came
close to 7%.202 This time, as opposed to 1999, bench trials were more
recurrent than trials by jury. They accounted for about 53% of all
trials.20 3 The 2001 survey, with Arkansas missing again, singled out
Puerto Rico (with a trial rate of about 10%), New Mexico (8%) and
Pennsylvania (about 7%).204 Expectedly, bench trials in Puerto Rico
accounted for 97% of all trials.205 The rate of bench trials in New
Mexico was 70% and in Pennsylvania, 68%.206 Finally, the survey for
2002-focusing upon felonies-brought Arkansas back to the top of
the list. The felony trial rate in that state was 6% (twice the national
average). 207 About 83% of Arkansas's felony trials were bench tri-
als. 208 Only 17% of the trials went to juries.20 9 In Puerto Rico, ajuris-
diction with a 10% felony trial rate, the incidence of bench felony
trials was 90%.210 New Mexico featured a felony trial rate of about
8%.211 There, bench trials accounted for 75% (only 1/4 of contested
felony cases went to juries).212
Arkansas's bench-trial statistics are noteworthy. They exhibit sys-
tematic prevalence of bench trials in a jurisdiction that gives defend-
ants no right to a bench trial. Arkansas law honors a defendant's
request for a bench trial only when the prosecution does not contest it
196 Id.
197 STATE COURTS 2001, supra note 182, at 63.
198 Id.
199 STATE COURTS 2000, supra note 182, at 68.




204 STATE COURTS 2002, supra note 182, at 61.
205 Id.
206 Id.
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and the court approves it.21 3 In practice, however, the prosecution
assents to and the court approves virtually any such request. Courts
only care about whether the defendant waived his right to a jury trial
"knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily." 214 The prosecutor's assent
to a bench trial is expected to be given-and appears to be given-as
a matter of course. 215 This indicates that Arkansas judges predomi-
nantly prefer bench trials and that prosecutors cooperate with those
judges. Defendants' preferences also align with the bench-trial for-
mat. Defendants rationally prefer a bench trial to a trial by jury when
they believe that the prosecution's evidence is not overwhelmingly
strong. Unfortunately, there was no reporting of the Arkansas acquit-
tal rates in bench and in jury trials, respectively. This factor could
verify (or falsify) our last observation.
Arkansas's high trial rates are equally noteworthy. Seemingly, a
defendant with no ambiguity aversion in mind and no attractive plea
bargain on the table should choose a trial by jury. In a high-trial-rate
environment, a defendant's strategic insistence on a time-consuming
jury trial is likely to extract an attractive plea bargain. The judge's
hostility in sentencing is a possible downside of this strategy. This
downside, however, depends on whether the jury will convict the de-
fendant. Before that happens, the prosecution would have to think
about economizing its efforts and helping the judge to reduce her
backlog by offering the defendant an attractive plea bargain. Most
213 See ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 7 ("[A] jury trial may be waived by the parties in all
cases in the manner prescribed by law.. . ."); ARK. R. CRIM. P. 31.1 ("No defendant in
any criminal cause may waive a trial by jury unless the waiver is assented to by the
prosecuting attorney and approved by the court."); State v. Singleton, 13 S.W.3d 584,
586 (Ark. 2000) (referring to ARK. R. CRIM. P. 31.1 and quoting Fretwell v. State, 708
S.W.2d 630, 632 (Ark. 1986) for the proposition that "'[t]he rule is clear. Criminal
cases which require trial by jury must be so tried unless (1) waived by the defendant,
(2) assented to by the prosecutor, and (3) approved by the court. The first two are
mandatory before the court has any discretion in the matter'").
214 See McCoy v. State, 962 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Ark. Ct. App. 1998) (underscoring
the centrality of the defendant's waiver).
215 Bujrell v. State, No. CACR 04-406, 2005 WL 419349 (Ark. Ct. App. Feb. 23,
2005), documents what appears to be a typical bench-trial stipulation: "When the trial
judge called appellant's case, the judge stated, 'I understand we're here for a bench
trial,' to which appellant's counsel responded, 'That's correct,Judge.' Prior to calling
any witnesses, the prosecutor asked, 'Being a bench trial, do we have-do we have
phases?' Appellant's counsel made the following response, 'No[t] really. We waive
the second phase.'" Id. The Court of Appeals ultimately found that "[t]he record
does not indicate whether appellant knew that he was entitled to a trial by jury if he so
desired; even if he knew of this right, the record is also silent with regard to whether
appellant wished to waive his right to ajury trial" and ruled that there was no waiver.
Id.
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defendants forfeiting their right to a jury trial therefore appear to be
driven by two factors. The first of those factors is the defendant's ac-
quittal prospect. Absence of such a prospect gives the defendant a
good reason for entering a guilty plea or opting for ajury trial strategi-
cally. The second factor is the defendant's ambiguity aversion. No
other reason adequately explains the preference for bench trials that
Arkansas defendants systematically exhibit.
Our analysis gains support from a cross-jurisdictional study of
hang juries, also conducted by the National Center for State Courts.216
This study pointed to a felony trial rate of 7%.217 This figure exceeds
the general trial rate (approximately, 3%) by more than double. The
study therefore focused on a high-trial-rate environment. Within this
7% figure, bench trials accounted for 4.3% and jury trials accounted
for 2.7%.218 That is, bench trials accounted for 61% of all felony cases
that went to trial. The remaining 39% of the cases were tried by ju-
ries. A high-trial-rate environment has once again exhibited the prev-
alence of bench trials.
Federal data support our theory from a different-and equally
important-angle. Our theory predicts high acquittal rates in bench
trials and low acquittal rates injury trials. Defendants with real acquit-
tal prospects predominantly prefer judges over juries because most
defendants are ambiguity averse. Defendants with no real prospect of
acquittal predominantly prefer a guilty plea. Some of them opt for a
jury trial because they have nothing to lose. 219
Federal prosecutions averaged 74,000 cases per year,220 of which
about 6% go to trial, 9% are dismissed, and in 85% of the cases de-
fendants are convicted after pleading guilty (or nolo contendere).221
Among the cases that go to trial, 73% are tried by juries and 27% are
216 See PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., NAT'L INST. FOR STATE COURTS, ARE
HUNG JURIES A PROBLEM? (2002), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publi-
cations/ResjuriesHunguriesProblemPub.pdf.
217 Id. at 20.
218 Id.
219 This finding aligns with the general prediction of Viscusi & Chesson, supra
note 62, that people seek ambiguity when the probability of loss is high.
220 This refers to the total number of indicted defendants See SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 12, at 445 tbl.5.42.
221 We extrapolated these percentages from the data reported by the SOURCEBOOK
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 12, at 423 tbl.5.22, with respect to five
consecutive years: 1998-2002. The 6% trial rate is close to the average felony trial
rate in state courts (7%), which is understandable because most federal trials involve
felonies. See, e.g., id. at 416 tbl.5.17; supra note 217 and accompanying text.
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bench trials.22 2 In bench trials, judges produce a staggering rate of
acquittals: 46%.223 On the average, they convict only 54% of defend-
ants-a conviction rate markedly lower than the jury's. 2 2 4 The vast
majority of defendants opting for a jury trial (85%) are convicted.2 25
The jury's acquittal rate is only 15%.226
The Table below summarizes the relevant data for the five-year
period between 1998 and 2002.
TABLE 1. DISPOSITION OF FEDERAL FELONY CASES
2 2 7
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Trials 7% 6% 6% 6% 4%
Bench 25% 25% 29% 36% 22%
Jury 75% 75% 71% 64% 78%
Bench Convictions 50% 47% 51% 68% 56%
Bench Acquittals 50% 53% 49% 32% 44%
Jury Convictions 86% 85% 85% 84% 85%
jury Acquittals 14% 15% 15% 16% 15%
Guilty Pleas/Nolo
Contendere 83% 84% 85% 85% 86%
Dismissals 10% 10% 9% 9% 9%
These data reveal a remarkable invariance in the rates attaching
to guilty pleas, dismissals, and trials. The modest trial rate and the
high rate of guilty pleas evidence meticulous case selection by the
prosecution. Federal prosecutors tend to indict defendants when the
probability of conviction-based on the evidence incriminating the
defendant-is relatively high. Federal prosecutors generally do not
prosecute weak cases. 228 The rates of conviction and acquittal among
222 See SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 12, at 423 tbl.5.22.
Note again that, under federal law, a defendant's request for a bench trial needs to be
consented to by the prosecution and approved by the judge. See supra note 15 and
accompanying text.




227 We extrapolated these percentages from the data reported by the SOURCEBOOK
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 12, at 423 tbl.5.22, as referring to years
1998-2002.
228 See Bibas, supra note 3, at 2472 ("[P]rosecutors have incentives to take to trial
only extremely strong cases and to bargain away weak ones.").
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juries is also invariant. The acquittal rate-15%-is relatively low.
The conviction rate-85%-is high. Jury trials account for 73% of all
trials, which may suggest that prosecutors often veto the defendants'
requests for a bench trial (due to the judges' acquittal rate, 46%, or
for other strategic reasons). This hypothesis, however, is probably
wrong. As already explained, prosecutors have strong incentives for
not opposing defendants' requests for a bench trial. Moreover, if the
prosecution were to oppose such requests strategically, then, presuma-
bly, it would have done so in its weakest cases. Our dataset, account-
ing for 74,000 federal prosecutions, shows exactly the opposite. The
prosecution's weakest cases, in which 46% of defendants were ulti-
mately acquitted, went to bench trials. The prosecution did not veto
this trial format.
These cases demonstrate ambiguity aversion on the part of the
defendants. In preferring bench trials over trials by jury, most of
these defendants were driven by their aversion towards ambiguity.
Their probability of innocence and the corresponding acquittal pros-
pect were substantial. The defendants wanted to avoid the dilution of
this probability in the unchartered waters ofjury trial. They opted for
a bench trial in order to protect this probability's determinacy.
If so, why did most defendants prefer a jury trial to a bench trial?
Why did they not capitalize on the judges' rate of acquittal? The pros-
ecution's indictment strategy adequately resolves this puzzle. Most de-
fendants indicted by federal prosecutors faced incriminating evidence
that was overwhelmingly strong. The vast majority of those defend-
ants (85%) found this evidence irresistible and pled guilty (with or
without plea bargaining). Some of those defendants took their
chances with the jury because they preferred-on perfectly rational
grounds-a slim chance of acquittal by ajury to a virtual conviction by
a judge. These defendants attempted to exploit the relative uncer-
tainty of a jury trial because their expected utility (acquittal) was
greater than the cost (trial expenses and the risk of retaliation by the
sentencing judge). This factor is probably responsible for an intensi-
fied resort to bench trials in 2001 (36%-9% above the average rate).
Defendants with slim prospects of acquittal (most of whom are factu-
ally guilty) tried to capitalize on the judges' high acquittal rate. They
did not succeed, though, because judges convicted 68% of defend-
ants, which brought their acquittal rate down to 32%. The jury's con-
viction rate for 2001 stayed within the usual (84%).229
229 This explanation aligns with a formal economic model developed by Gerald D.
Gay, Martin F. Grace, Jayant R. Kale, and Thomas H. Noe. See Gerald D. Gay et al.,
Noisy Juries and the Choice of Trial Mode in a Sequential Signalling Game: Theory and Evi-
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To sum up, we have identified empirically two general trends that
verify the ambiguity-aversion theory. First, high trial rates correlate with
the prevalence of bench trials. High trial rates originate from a
nonmeticulous screening of cases by the prosecution and from a cor-
respondingly large number of thinly evidenced accusations. Defend-
ants facing such accusations predominantly plead not guilty and
prefer a bench trial. Second, the rate of acquittal in bench trials is much
higher than in trials by jury. Bench trials are strongly preferred by de-
fendants with solid acquittal prospects. Ambiguity aversion is the only
plausible explanation for this preference. Defendants with solid ac-
quittal prospects have much to lose and are therefore unwilling to
depend upon unpredictable juries.
The empirical data relevant to our theory are, admittedly, incom-
plete. We could not obtain any reliable data on the disposition of
criminal cases in Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Montana,
Nebraska, and New Hampshire-jurisdictions in which defendants
are entitled to choose a bench trial unilaterally.
230
Additional jurisdictions in which defendants have a similar enti-
tlement are New York, 23 1 Ohio, 2 3 2 and Iowa. 233 In 1998, New York
dence, 20 RAND J. ECON. 196, 197-204 (1989). This model assumes that jurors are
"noisier" (more error prone) than judges. Id. at 197. Defendants facing strong in-
criminating evidence (most of whom are guilty) consequently select the "noisiest"
trial mode: a trial by jury. Defendants facing weak incriminating evidence (most of
whom are innocent) choose the least noisy trial mode: a bench trial. Id. at 212. The
authors substantiate this model by empirical data on bench and jury trials in Florida
and Texas. Id. at 206-08. These data reveal that "most defendants choose jury trials
even though bench trials have lower conviction rates." Id. at 207; cf Andrew D. Lei-
pold, Why Are Federal Judges So Acquittal Prone?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 151 (2005) (observ-
ing that high acquittal rates in federal bench trials have no clear explanation and
hypothesizing that they may be related to the decrease in the judges' sentencing
discretion).
230 See supra notes 29, 31 and accompanying text. We also could not obtain relia-
ble data on the disposition of criminal cases by Oregon courts. For our purposes, this
jurisdiction is nearly as significant as Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland,
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, and Ohio. Oregon courts have a
discretion not to honor the defendant's request for a bench trial, but the prosecution
cannot veto it. See supra note 32. Therefore, when the court finds the defendant's
stated desire to be tried by a judge alone both willful and informed, the defendant's
wish will likely be granted. The Minnesota rule is the same. See supra note 32. In
2001, 60% of all Minnesota trials were bench trials, but the trial rate was only 1%.
STATE COURTS 2002, supra note 182, at 61. In 2002, the trial rate was 4% with only
25% of bench trials. STATE COURTS 2003, supra note 182, at 44. There was no report-
ing on 1998, 1999, and 2000.
231 See supra note 28.
232 See supra note 31.
233 See supra note 30.
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exhibited a 5.7% trial rate, 2% above the national average of 3.7%.234
About 82% of all New York trials in that year were jury trials.235 Bench
trials accounted for the remaining 18%.236 Ohio mirrored the na-
tional average with a 3.7% trial rate. 237 Of all Ohio trials, 70% were
jury trials and 30% were bench trials.238 Both jurisdictions had similar
trial distributions in 1999. Bench trials in New York accounted for
19% and jury trials for 81% (within a trial rate of 5.7%).239 Bench
trials in Ohio accounted for 30% and jury trials for 70% (within a trial
rate of 3.7%).240 The national trial-rate average in that year was
3.1%.241 The surveys for 2000 and 2001 did not include New York and
Ohio courts. In 2002, New York had a 5% trial rate, 2% above the
national average (of 3%).242 Amongst NewYork trials, 80% were tried
by juries and 20% by judges in bench trials.243 Ohio had a 3% trial
rate in the same year.2 44 Of all its trials, 67% went to juries and 33%
were decided by judges.245
Criminal defendants in Iowa predominantly preferred bench tri-
als. This preference generated a bench-trial rate that increased from
67% in 2000 to 70% and 75%, respectively, in 2001 and 2002.246
Iowa's tri-annual trial rate was only 2.7%-about 0.3% below the na-
tional average.
These data are inconclusive for two reasons. The trial rates in
Ohio fall within the average. In Iowa, they are below the average.
This indicates that prosecutors in both Iowa and Ohio meticulously
select cases for prosecution. As a result, most defendants enter into
guilty pleas, both unilateral and bargained. Whether these defend-
ants are averse towards ambiguity is impossible to ascertain. In New
York, the trial rates are markedly above the average, but are still not





239 See STATE COURTS 2000, supra note 182, at 68.
240 See id.
241 Id.




246 See STATE COURTS 2001, supra note 182, at 63; STATE COURTS 2002, supra note
182, at 61; STATE COURTS 2003, supra note 182, at 44. There were no data on Iowa
courts for 1998. The 1999 data were flawed: it reported the overall trial rate of 2.2%
as composed by 0.6% and 0.4% of bench and jury trials, respectively. See STATE
COURTS 2000, supra note 182, at 67-68.
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high enough relative to other high-trial-rate jurisdictions. Crucially,
the acquittal rates in bench trials that took place in Iowa, New York,
and Ohio are unknown. Our theory predicts that this rate is much
higher than the rate of acquittals injury trials, but we could not verify
it.
To test our theory's validity, we also examined the demands for
two informational products: information predicting jury verdicts and
information predicting the decision by ajudge. These demands origi-
nate from trial attorneys. Trial attorneys are more or less informed
about the relevant legal doctrine and court practices. Money ex-
pended by these attorneys on either of the two products indicates the
relative demand for each. This factor is also indicative of the prod-
uct's utility. Greater demand for information predicting jury verdicts
indicates that jury trials are not as predictable as bench trials. Greater
demand for information that predicts judges' decisions in bench trials
indicates the opposite.247
Based on this criterion, we compared the jury consultants market
with the parallel market for judge consultant services. We have found
a relatively thriving market for jury consultants248 and no market for
judge-consultants. Jury consulting also appears to be a gainful
industry. 249
247 Trial expenses are paid by clients rather than by their attorneys. Arguably, an
attorney's willingness to expend her client's money on trial-predicting information
does not necessarily indicate that this information is useful. We disagree. The com-
petition in the market for legal services induces attorneys to economize their clients'
trial expenses.
248 See NEILJ. KRESSEL & DORIT F. KRESSEL, STACK AND SXwAy: THE NEW SCIENCE OF
JURY CONSULTING 14-19, 61-92 (2002) (identifying the increasing demand for jury
consultant services and analyzing the jury consultant industry).
249 See id. at 65, 74 (describing jury consultancy as a burgeoning business); Solo-
mon M. Fulero & Steven D. Penrod, The Myths and Realities of Attorney Jury Selection
Folklore and Scientific Jury Selection: What Works?, 17 OHio N.U. L. REV. 229, 229 (1990)
(observing that jury consultants demand fees upwards of $100,000 per case and work
on multimillion dollar cases); Heath R. Patterson, Juiy Selection: Prosecution's Final Fron-
tier, PROSECUTOR, Nov.-Dec. 2001, at 29, 29 (reporting that prosecutors often need
jury consultant assistance, but cannot afford it because consultant fees are exorbi-
tant); Kate Rix, Jury Consultants Play Meatier Role in Trial Prep, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 7, 2000,
at A13 (reporting that the full package ofjury selection, monitoring, and persuasion
consulting may cost about $200,000); Franklin Strier & Donna Shestowsky, Profiling
the Profilers: A Study of the Trial Consulting Profession, Its Impact on Trial Justice and What,
if Anything, To Do About It, 1999 WIs. L. REV. 441, 446 (observing proliferation of jury
consulting and that its typical clients are the wealthy and the privileged); Stephanie
Leonard Yarbrough, The Jury Consultant-Friend or Foe ofJustice, 54 SMU L. REV. 1885,
1887 (2001) (stating that jury consultants generally demand high fees); see also What
Consultant Will Be Looking for, DAILY ARDMOREITE (Ardmore, Okla.), Mar. 17, 1997, at
2A (reporting that the industry accounts for about 500jury consultants). Our Yahoo
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Jury consultant services utilize sociological and psychological re-
search. 250 These services include both qualitative and quantitative
jury research. 25 1 Qualitative jury research uses a limited number of
surrogate jurors (typically, up to fifty) drawn from the relevant com-
munity. The research identifies these jurors' reactions to evidence
and arguments that can be presented in the future trial. After hearing
the evidence and the arguments, the surrogate jurors will be divided
into subgroups that will separately deliberate the verdict. This meth-
odology singles out the most effective arguments and evidence along
with the jurors' profiling trends.252 The jurors' profiling trends are
the sets of attitudes, experiences and beliefs that are favorable or, in-
versely, inimical to the client's case.253 Quantitative research focuses
on a large pool of surrogate jurors (about 400), who respond to care-
fully designed questionnaires ("community attitude surveys") .254
These responses identify attitudes, experiences and beliefs favorable
and unfavorable to the client's case.255 This research strategy aims at
developing dependable juror profiles. 256 It also identifies the "hot
questions" that facilitate the jurors' selection and de-selection during
voir dire.257
The economic gap separating jury consulting services from judge
consulting services has a straightforward explanation. Trial attorneys
often require sociological and psychological data that facilitate predic-
tions ofjury trials. They virtually never require similar data in relation
to bench trials (and about judges' decisions generally). If these data
were useful, attorneys would systematically require them. Bench trials
are numerous and their stakes are high. Attorneys, nevertheless, are
generally unwilling to pay for sociological and psychological informa-
tion about judges. For them, information about court practices and
legal doctrine is sufficient for predicting judges' decisions.
search (run on July 18, 2005) has identified advertisements from eighty jury consult-
ant firms. Some of these firms are listed in the directory of ASTC, the American
Society of Trial Consultants. See ASTC, Consultant Locator, http://www.astcweb.org/
consultantlocator/list.php?searchme=Viewall (last visited Feb. 21, 2006).
250 See KRESSEL & KRESSEL, supra note 248, at 14-16, 93-135.
251 Walter F. Becker, Jr., How To Use a Jury Consultant: A Guide for Trial Attorneys, 50
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CONCLUSION
The complex problem identified by this Article has a simple solu-
tion. Criminal defendants should be allowed to opt for a bench trial
unilaterally. This proposal calls for a change in the prevalent constitu-
tional doctrine that guarantees criminal defendants the right to ajury
trial, but not the right to a trial by a judge. Giving a defendant the
right to choose a bench trial instead of a trial by jury would enable
him to disambiguate his probability of conviction. This disambigua-
tion would divest the prosecution of its power to force defendants into
harsh and inefficient plea bargains by exploiting their ambiguity aver-
sion. In reality, prosecutors already have strong incentives not to veto
the defendant's request for a bench trial. The quality of criminal jus-
tice, however, must not depend on the endurance of these incentives
and the prosecutor's good will. The defendant's right to a bench trial
is as important as his or her entitlement to a trial by jury. This right
merits constitutional protection.
The general approach taken by this Article focuses upon prosecu-
tors and defendants as negotiating plea bargains in the shadow of the
trial.25 8 We perceive criminal procedure as setting the background
conditions for plea bargaining and examine the fairness and social
utility of these conditions. This approach does away with the trial-
centered perspective that often fails to acknowledge the prevalence of
plea bargains in the criminal justice system. 259
Arguably, the defendant's right to a bench trial may engender a
pro-defendant bias among trial judges. When the prosecution cannot
veto the defendant's trial-mode preference, it loses its leverage with
thejudge. Thejudge would then need to induce the defendant alone
not to opt for a jury trial (an effort intensive and time consuming trial
mode with few career enhancing returns for the judge). The judge
consequently may decide to acquit more defendants than justified and
to exercise leniency in sentencing the convicted defendants. Because
258 See also Bibas, supra note 3, at 2528-30 (arguing that alongside the "shadow of
the law," numerous other factors, such as ignorance, money, self-interest, and demo-
graphic variation, influence plea bargaining); cf Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Korn-
hauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950
(1979) (stating that in divorce and other cases the law impacts the negotiation and
bargaining that occur before the parties reach the courtroom).
259 See FISHER, supra note 4, at 230 (attesting that plea bargain is a prevalent form
of case disposition in American courts); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 7, at 1911-12. For
a powerful critique of trial-centeredness, see Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and
Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE LJ. 1097, 1150-54 (2001).
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acquittals are generally not appealable 260 and sentences not review-
able,261 judges might find this strategy particularly convenient.
This prediction is overstated. Defendants with ambiguity aversion
prefer bench trials whenever their acquittal chances are substantial.
They do not require any additional inducement from the judge.
These defendants are also largely innocent. Defendants with solid ac-
quittal prospects and no ambiguity aversion are largely innocent as
well. Concessions inducing such defendants to prefer a bench trial
are therefore unlikely to produce social harm.
Defendants with slim chances of acquittal generally prefer jury
trials. A credible (and corrupt) promise of acquittal would induce
many such defendants to opt for a bench trial. An extreme leniency
in sentencing-if credibly promised by the judge-would achieve the
same result. Most judges, however, would reject such strategies for
being not only blatantly unlawful, but also irrational. Instead of pur-
suing these strategies, judges may simply increase the sentence of a
defendant whose trial was a waste of time. This measure would induce
defendants with slim chances of acquittal to plead guilty.
Defendants whose prospects of acquittal are neither slim nor
solid fall into the in-between category. These defendants are potential
recipients of the judges' unmeritorious concessions. Many such de-
fendants are guilty. Concessions received by these defendants there-
fore would be socially harmful. Other defendants falling into the in-
between category are innocent. Concessions that these defendants
would receive would not be detrimental to society. Unmeritorious
concessions that would go to the guilty defendants are likely to be
offset by the prevented harm. Harm that the prosecution would oth-
erwise produce by forcing defendants into harsh and inefficient plea
bargains is both substantial and systematic.
The judges' concessions to defendants are also unlikely to be sub-
stantial. Any substantial concession to a defendant who appears to be
guilty would mar the judge's reputation and dilute her promotion
prospects. 262 For a state judge, the "soft on crime" image is particu-
larly damaging. This image frustrates the community's "tough on
crime" expectation from the judge and may block the judge's future
reelection. 263 The judge's incentives for promotion and reelection
260 See supra notes 113-24 and accompanying text.
261 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 18, § 26.3 (g), at 1214-16 (stating that the prevalent
doctrine exempts from appellate review any sentence that falls within statutory limits).
262 POSNER, supra note 97, at 542-45 (observing that judges are generally reluctant
to make decisions that may damage their reputation).
263 See, e.g., Fred B. Burnside, Dying To Get Elected: A Challenge to the Jury Override,
1999 Wis. L. Ruv. 1017, 1037-38 (observing that state judges uniformly campaign as
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would normally override her incentive to clear dockets through con-
cession-induced bench trials.
tough on crime and sometimes seek death penalty cases to get their name in the press
and enhance their tough-on-crime reputations); Jason J. Czarnezki, Voting and Electo-
ral Politics in the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 87 MARQ. L. REv. 323, 346 (2003) (observing
that the electorate prefers judges who are tough on crime); see also Posner, supra note
129, at 1267 (underscoring state judges' dependency on the public opinion and ob-
serving that "[a]s long as the populist element in adjudication does not swell to the
point where unpopular though innocent people are convicted of crimes or other
gross departures from the rule of law occur, conforming judicial policies to demo-
cratic preference can be regarded as a good thing in a society that prides itself on
being the world's leading democracy").
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